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A Long-Run Model of Development 
for Central America 
Introduction 
It is customary to refer to the 1980s in Latin America as 'the lost decade' in 
recognition of the heavy price paid by the region in terms of falling living 
standards as a result of the debt crisis. Central America has also suffered from 
the debt crisis, but in addition has had to cope with the effects of war, massive 
displacements of refugees and several natural disasters. Thus, for Central 
America the 1980s has been more than a lost decade; it represents perhaps the 
worst crisis in its post-independence history. As Table 1 shows, GDP per head 
in 1990 was still below the level recorded in 1980 in all five republics and the 
cumulative decline in Nicaragua was over 40 per cent. 
Under these circumstances, the task of economic and social reconstruction 
in the 1990s acquires overwhelming importance. Yet here again Central 
America faces special problems. The impressive growth rates in Central 
America in the three decades after 1947/8 were based on an economic model 
which collapsed in the 1980s and which cannot be restored in the 1990s. Thus, 
the task of reconstruction in the 1990s can only be achieved on the basis of a 
new model. 
The pre-1980 economic model rested on three pillars.1 The first pillar was 
the rapid growth of traditional agroexports (above all, coffee, bananas, cotton, 
beef and sugar); earnings from these exports underpinned the region's exchange 
rates, making possible a regime of fixed dollar exchange rates which put 
Central America in effect on a dollar standard (the second pillar); the 
combination of buoyant extraregional exports and the dollar standard made 
possible the rapid growth of intraregional trade through the Central American 
Common Market (the third pillar). 
The collapse of the first pillar in the 1980s is unlikely to be a temporary 
phenomenon. While traditional agroexports will of course continue to play a 
major part in Central American economic activity, they are unlikely to play a 
dynamic role; yet the region desperately needs sources of dynamism to raise 
living standards quickly in the 1990s. Problems of market access (e.g. sugar), 
costs (e.g. cotton) and ecology (e.g. beef) suggest that the best that can be 
expected from traditional agroexports is slow growth in both volume and value 
terms. Only in the case of bananas are the medium-term prospects favourable 
as a result of the opening of the Eastern European market on the one hand and 
on the other the move to a single market in the European Community after 
1992.2 
TABLE 1 






mala Honduras Nicarag 
1980 1759 1325 1085 1015 1097 
1981 1670 1177 1062 992 1124 
1982 1505 1079 996 936 1078 
1983 1500 1082 944 899 1082 
1984 1571 1093 922 890 1015 
1985 1538 1096 891 892 935 
1986 1577 1086 867 890 886 
1987 1605 1092 872 907 848 
1988 1614 1088 879 923 734 
1989 1659 1062 887 906 689 
1990 1676 1069 888 871 629 
1981-90 -4.7% -19.3% -18.2% -14.2% -42.7% 
(Cumulative variation) 
Sources'. Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in 
Latin America, 1990 Report, Washington DC., 1990 for 1980 to 1988. For 
1989 and 1990, the figures have been derived from United Nations, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Preliminary Overview of the 
Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, December, 1990. 
If traditional exports cannot be relied on to generate the necessary increases 
in foreign exchange reserves, then the search has to begin for new sources of 
export dynamism. Non-traditional exports, however, are sensitive to the 
exchange rate and require - particularly in the early stages - real exchange rate 
depreciation. Thus, a regime of fixed nominal exchange rates is not realistic for 
the 1990s. 
The Central American Common Market (CACM) cannot therefore be 
reestablished on its old basis; the dollar standard has collapsed and traditional 
exports cannot be relied upon to provide the hard currency to finance 
imbalances in intraregional trade. This does not mean that the CACM does not 
have a role to play in the reconstruction of Central America in the 1990s, but 
it does mean that regional integration will have to rest on new foundations. The 
old foundations have been destroyed and cannot be restored. 
There are other problems which the reconstruction of the Central American 
economies will have to face in the 1990s. The growth model of the pre-1980 
period was successful when judged by the rise in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per head, but much less successful when judged by changes in income 
distribution, reduction in poverty and other social indicators. In the 1980s there 
is widespread agreement that these problems have become worse; indeed, some 
studies on poverty suggest that, far from being a 'marginal' phenomenon, it is 
very widespread, affecting more than half the population throughout the region 
and more than 70 per cent in Guatemala.3 Clearly, a new economic model for 
Central America in the 1990s which did not address the poverty issue explicitly 
would be seriously at fault. 
The same is true of environmental questions. The pre-1980 economy growth 
in Central America took place with little regard for ecological issues and the 
maintenance of the environment; in effect, the environment was treated (as in 
so many countries) as a free resource to be exploited at will. The result was 
serious depletion of the forest cover, pollution of rivers and lakes and the first 
signs of soil exhaustion in some agricultural areas. The problem in Central 
America is not as serious as in some other Latin American countries (e.g. 
Haiti), but a new economic model for the region cannot continue to treat the 
environment as a free resource.4 
While research in the social sciences has revealed a clearer understanding of 
the costs and benefits of the pre-1980 model, the decade of the 1980s has added 
a series of economic problems which were not present before. Outstanding 
among these are the debt problem, the friction between the private and public 
sectors and the rise of un- and under-employment. 
In 1982, the year of the threatened Mexican default, only Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua were acknowledged to have a debt problem. Since then, all five 
republics have run into difficulties with their debt service payments, to the 
point where the accumulation of arrears had become the rule rather than the 
exception by the end of the 1980s. The application of the Brady Plan for debt 
reduction to Costa Rica in 1990 has brought debt relief to one country in the 
region, but the others still have some way to go before the debt crisis can be 
put behind them.5 Indeed, the external debt in Nicaragua jumped from some 
$2 billion in 1980 to nearly $9 billion in 1990 - 27 times greater than the value 
of exports in that year. 
By contrast, the lack of confidence between the private and public sectors -
although not immune to outside pressures - has been primarily a Central 
American phenomenon. The private sector in the 1980s accused the public 
sector of waste, inefficiency and incompetence and called for a smaller state, 
while the public sector deplored the short-term vision of the private sector and 
its alleged preference for capital flight over long-term investment. Clearly, this 
friction was in large part a reflection of the economic crisis of the 1980s, but 
it was also a cause of the economic problems. By the beginning of 1991, 
however, governments with the support and approval of the private sector had 
come to power in all five countries and the relationship between the private and 
the public sector began to improve. 
A necessary condition for growth in the 1990s is the completion of 
stabilisation programmes; a 'dash for growth' before stabilisation is completed 
would be a recipe for disaster. Stabilisation programmes began as early as 1980 
(in Costa Rica), but even now are still not complete in any of the republics; 
some would argue, therefore, that it is inappropriate to discuss the content of 
long-run models while the battle for stabilisation still has to be won. This is 
very misleading. Stabilisation programmes, by definition, focus on the short-
term with policies designed to restore internal and external equilibrium. These 
short-term measures, however, sometimes have long-term implications; this 
means that a long-run model may be implicit in a stabilisation programme 
although the authorities are not necessarily conscious of this and indeed may 
not approve of the long-run consequences. A good example of a short-term 
stabilisation programme with long-run implications (albeit one that the 
authorities welcomed) is the reaction to the 1929 depression in the larger Latin 
American republics; the measures taken to restore external equilibrium 
provided the framework for import-substituting industrialisation over the long-
run. 
Given that short-term stabilisation policies can have long-run implications, 
it makes sense to have a vision of the future to avoid inconsistencies. In 
addition, many outside actors in Central America (notably the World Bank) 
have a very clear vision of the region's future; there is nothing wrong with this 
- indeed, one would expect nothing less from a prestigious international agency 
- but at the end of the day Central America's future needs to be determined by 
Central Americans. In turn, that requires the adoption of a long-run model by 
the region's leaders. Such a model may have many features in common with the 
models proposed by outside agencies, but it is unlikely to correspond exactly. 
Thus, the need for a long-run model cannot be dispensed with simply 
because stabilisation and adjustment programmes are still incomplete. At the 
same time, the design of stabilisation and adjustment programmes needs to take 
into account the long-run model. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the 
record on stabilisation in Central America in order to see what lessons can be 
learned. 
Stabilisation and Adjustment Programmes 
More than a decade has passed since the first stabilisation programmes were 
adopted in Central America to cope with the series of external and internal 
shocks which struck the region at the end of the 1970s.6 Since stabilisation is 
widely recognised as an essential precondition for adjustment programmes 
leading to sustainable long-run growth, the importance of successful 
stabilisation cannot be overemphasised. No Central American country can 
afford to repeat the fall in living standards experienced in the 1980s, so that 
growth of real income per head in the 1990s is the highest priority. Yet the 
basis for sustainable long-run growth in the current decade will be fragile if 
stabilisation has not been completed successfully. 
Despite numerous attempts at stabilisation, not one of the five Central 
American countries has yet succeeded in laying a really solid foundation for 
stable and sustainable growth. Even in Costa Rica, the republic which has made 
the most progress on policy reform, the annual growth rate of real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) fluctuates widely with a year of fast growth 
(approximately five per cent) being followed by one of slow growth (less than 
three per cent) as the economy runs up against numerous constraints which past 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes have failed to remove. 
One of the consequences of the failure of stabilisation has been a dismal 
growth record. Not a single country - not even Costa Rica - had recovered the 
1980 level of real GDP per head by 1990. Although the 1980s was the 'lost 
decade' for all Latin America, the drop in living standards was more severe in 
Central America with the four northern republics all recording a fall in real 
GDP per head through the 1980s which was faster than the Latin American 
average, while Nicaragua recorded the most dramatic decline (five per cent per 
year from 1981 to 1989) of any Latin American republic.7 
Throughout the region, internal disequilibrium - manifested in budget deficits 
and high rates of inflation - remains a problem. The same is true, however, of 
external disequilibrium which is reflected in trade and current account deficits 
in the balance of payments. Furthermore, the situation is in some respects 
worse than a decade ago, since all republics now suffer from double digit 
annual inflation rates and the chances of funding balance of payments deficits 
with official capital flows are receding as the Bush administration in the United 
States - the principal source of lending to the region - adjusts its official 
lending policy to the geopolitical realities of the post-cold war era.8 Thus, an 
unchanged current account deficit may imply an even greater external 
disequilibrium than before as a result of the expected decline in official capital 
flows from the major donor. 
In small countries with poorly developed capital markets - as is the case in 
Central America - the fiscal position is often a crucial determinant of internal 
disequilibrium. Even a relatively modest budget deficit (expressed as a 
proportion of GDP) can lead to inflationary pressures as a result of the 
monetary implications of deficit financing. Thus, an important test of 
stabilisation programmes in Central America has to do with fiscal policy. 
Since many republics in Central America went into the 1980s with a ratio of 
government revenue to GDP which was low by international standards, an 
increase in this ratio might have seemed an appropriate way to implement a 
tighter fiscal policy leading to internal equilibrium. Yet, as Table 2 shows, the 
ratio was either stationary or falling in the last years of the 1980s. Indeed, El 
Salvador and Guatemala ended the decade with a ratio below ten per cent, 
which is among the lowest in Latin America. In Nicaragua, despite draconian 
tax increases in the first years of the Sandinista regime, the ratio fell sharply 
after 1984 as the high and accelerating rate of inflation eroded the real value 
of tax receipts and the burden of taxation was offset in part through delayed 
payments.9 
Even more disturbing than the ratio of government revenue to GDP has been 
the composition of revenue itself. In a region long noted for its dependence on 
indirect (including trade) taxes and for its small number of direct taxpayers, an 
increase in the proportion of government revenue from income and/or property 
taxes might have seemed an appropriate route to fiscal orthodoxy. Yet the 
opposite in general has happened. In three republics (El Salvador, Honduras 
and Guatemala) the proportion was lower in 1989 than in 1980 and in Costa 
Rica the proportion has been falling since 1983. Only Guatemala has managed 
to increase this ratio, but it is still one of the lowest in the region since the 
republic started from such a low base (14 per cent in 1980). 
TABLE 2 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
Costa El Guate-
Rica Salvador mala Honduras Nicaragua 
1980 12.8 11.4 9.5 14.9 21.3 
1981 13.6 12.8 8.6 13.4 24.1 
1982 14.4 12.3 8.4 13.4 25.3 
1983 16.6 12.4 7.8 13.3 30.9 
1984 16.6 13.2 7.3 15.1 34.9 
1985 16.2 13.4 7.7 15.6 32.1 
1986 15.4 14.4 8.9 15.6 32.0 
1987 15.7 11.9 9.4 16.3 27.7 
1988 15.2 10.4 10.1 16.1 20.5 
1989 15.0 8.2 9.2 15.6 18.9 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in 
Latin America, 1990 Report, Washington DC., 1990, Table C-l, p. 275 
The failure to raise the ratio of government revenue to GDP has forced those 
responsible for the design of stabilisation programmes to put greater emphasis 
on cutting expenditure as the means to reduce budget deficits. Certainly 
substantial progress has been achieved in all republics in reducing the ratio of 
expenditure to GDP, but in far too many cases the reduction has come through 
cuts in public investment (including health and education). Since there is a 
growing recognition (even in neoliberal circles) of the complementarity of 
public and private investment, the opportunity cost of cutting expenditure 
through reducing public capital formation is high. Indeed, in some republics 
(e.g. El Salvador) public investment has fallen to the point where negative 
'crowding in' is far more of a danger than 'crowding out'.10 
The cuts in government expenditure in Nicaragua were not sufficient, at least 
until 1989, to prevent the emergence of a massive budget deficit which was the 
prime cause of accelerating inflation. In 1988 the Sandinista regime had the 
dubious distinction of presiding over the highest annual rate of inflation (33,603 
per cent) ever recorded in Latin America. Elsewhere, budget deficits as a 
proportion of GDP were lower at the end of the decade than at the beginning, 
but the inflationary implications were still considerable and the size of the 
fiscal deficit was a major factor behind the increase in the cost of living index 
in all republics (see Table 3). Indeed, Guatemala and Honduras began the new 
decade with rates of inflation higher than ever recorded since the 1940s. 
TABLE 3 
ANNUAL RATES OF INFLATION (%). DECEMBER TO DECEMBER 
Costa El Guate-
Rica Salvador mala Honduras Nicaragua 
1982 81.7 13.8 -2.0 8.8 22.2 
1983 10.7 15.5 15.4 7.2 35.5 
1984 17.3 9.8 5.2 3.7 47.3 
1985 11.1 30.8 31.5 4.2 334.3 
1986 15.4 30.3 25.7 3.2 747.4 
1987 16.4 19.6 10.1 2.7 1347.4 
1988 25.3 18.2 11.0 6.7 33602.6 
1989 10.0 23.5 20.2 11.4 1690.0 
1990 22.4 19.9 50.1 25.3 8500.0 
Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 1990, Santiago, December 1990, Table 5. 
The poor fiscal record did not reflect the lack of attempts at fiscal reform as 
much.as the failure of such attempts. In Guatemala, for example, the efforts of 
the Cerezo administration (1986-90) at tax reform were largely undermined by 
the opposition of a well-organised private sector. In Costa Rica, numerous 
attempts were made in the 1980s to improve the efficiency of tax collection, but 
the fiscal privileges offered to exporters of non-traditional products tended to 
overwhelm the modest tax gains achieved under President Monge (1982-86) 
and President Arias (1986-90). 
In Nicaragua any prospects of tax reform were undermined by the 
acceleration of inflation which - as already argued - eroded the real value of tax 
receipts and gave taxpayers a strong incentive to delay payments. Not a single 
country made any progress on negotiations with the US government which 
might have led to taxation agreements affecting flight capital to Miami and 
other US cities. 
The problem of internal disequilibrium has been aggravated by the political 
constraints on tax reform and the lack of consensus on the appropriate measures 
to take to reduce budget deficits. By contrast, there has been widespread 
acceptance that external disequilibrium should be tackled by measures to 
promote exports rather than suppress imports. Painful choices have arisen, 
however, as soon as the policy debate has moved from the general question of 
export promotion to the specifics of how to achieve it. 
Among the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, there is a conviction that the most 
appropriate way to promote exports is through a depreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate (REER), trade liberalisation and the encouragement of 
direct foreign investment (DFI). These three ingredients, part of the so-called 
Washington consensus11, have met with a mixed reception in Central America. 
The commitment to depreciation of the REER has proved to be a painful pill 
to swallow for several reasons. First, in small open economies (such as in 
Central America) the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate has an 
important bearing on the rate of inflation; thus, a small depreciation of the 
REER usually requires a large nominal devaluation with serious inflationary 
implications. Secondly, the five republics of Central America had a long history 
before the 1980s of relative exchange rate stability with currencies pegged to 
the US dollar; this nominal anchor had proved extremely useful in stimulating 
productive investment, avoiding capital flight and reducing currency transaction 
costs. 
Not surprisingly, exchange rate policy in Central America has been fraught 
with problems in the last decade. Honduras only abandoned its fixed nominal 
rate (unchanged since 1918) in 1990; Guatemala has oscillated between 
devaluing the exchange rate to promote exports and intervening to control 
inflation; Nicaragua's devaluations, both under the Sandinistas and President 
Chamorro, have tended to be too little too late; the Cristiani administration in 
El Salvador was at first wary of freeing the exchange rate because of the 
possible impact on inflation - only to find that capital inflows from remittances, 
reverse capital flight and IFIs were producing an equilibrium exchange rate that 
was almost certainly overvalued in relation to the requirements of export 
promotion.12 Only in Costa Rica has a consistent exchange rate policy been 
pursued, providing exporters with a stable REER after an initial real 
depreciation in the first half of the 1980s. 
Trade liberalisation has been equally problematic. The Common External 
Tariff (CET), a requirement of the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), had been revised in the mid-1980s, but both the average tariff rate 
and tariff dispersion were considered too high by the IFIs. Under its Structural 
Adjustment Loans (SAL), the World Bank was able to persuade Costa Rica to 
break ranks and reduce tariffs unilaterally; similar steps were taken in El 
Salvador and Honduras, but tariff policy in the region is no longer harmonised 
(although the Presidential summit in San Salvador in July 1991 did at least set 
a future date for harmonisation). Furthermore, measures to liberalise 
extraregional imports have often been matched by additional restrictions on 
intraregional trade so that the recovery of the CACM has been delayed longer 
than necessary. 
Policies towards DFI have been generally liberal. In Nicaragua, the 
Sandinistas vacillated for years over the adoption of a Foreign Investment Law, 
but the lack of interest on the part of private investors made the debate rather 
sterile. However, Central America has traditionally adopted liberal policies 
towards DFI and the problem since the end of the 1970s has been a reluctance 
on the part of foreign investors to invest in a region perceived as politically 
unstable at the same time as other regions have become increasingly attractive. 
Again, it is no surprise to find that the record on external disequilibrium has 
been rather patchy. Costa Rica has enjoyed considerable success in the 
promotion of non-traditional exports, but the high (and rising) propensity to 
import has left a gap in the current account which is almost as large as at the 
beginning of the 1980s. The strong exchange rate in El Salvador is making it 
hard for many industrialists and farmers to adjust to the shock of trade 
liberalisation. The experiment with neoliberal policies in Honduras under 
President Callejas threatens to be short-lived as the losers from trade 
liberalisation and REER depreciation prove to be far more vocal than the 
winners. 
Just as in many other parts of Latin America, serious efforts have been made 
to introduce policy reform, to implement stabilisation packages and to adopt 
adjustment programmes in Central America. It would be harsh indeed not to 
recognise the enormous sacrifices demanded of the Nicaraguan people in the 
name of stabilisation both under the Sandinistas in 1988-89 and under President 
Chamorro in 1990-91. Similarly, the Cristiani government in El Salvador 
deserves credit for the courageous way in which it has tackled both stabilisation 
and adjustment since coming to power in mid-1989. Yet, at the beginning of the 
1990s, it is difficult to say with confidence that a single country has so far truly 
laid the solid foundation needed for fast growth in the next decade. 
Numerous explanations can be found for the lack of progress in 
implementing successful stabilisation and adjustment programmes in Central 
America. The fragile social and political situation in all republics except Costa 
Rica has encouraged policy makers to postpone awkward decisions as long as 
possible. In the case of internal disequilibrium, measures to tackle budget 
deficits and accelerating inflation can be postponed almost indefinitely, for a 
government is only forced to act (as the Sandinistas found to their cost) as 
hyperinflation approaches. External disequilibrium, on the other hand, must be 
addressed unless the country concerned has access to sufficient capital inflows 
to finance the deficit or is prepared to ration the limited supply of foreign 
exchange through draconian import controls. Both alternatives were widely 
adopted in Central America in the 1980s, with El Salvador and Honduras in 
particular using official capital inflows to postpone harsh decisions and 
Nicaragua being the most dependent on foreign exchange rationing. 
A second problem has been the lack of consensus on the appropriate 
measures to take. The bitter debates over exchange rate policy in Honduras and 
tax reform in Guatemala have already been mentioned. Nicaragua under the 
Sandinistas could not reach consensus on foreign investment. The issue of land 
reform in El Salvador has proved deeply divisive and the lack of consensus has 
had numerous implications for adjustment and stabilisation. Even in Costa Rica, 
where consensus on export promotion has at least been achieved, there remain 
numerous divisions over tax reform and financial liberalisation. Furthermore, 
constitutional rigidities in Costa Rica have often prevented the executive from 
implementing a consistent policy even when a broad consensus has existed. 
A third, and widespread, problem has been the reluctance to tackle all 
aspects of stabilisation and adjustment simultaneously. Although such 'general 
equilibrium' solutions are generally recognised to be preferable, they have been 
abandoned in favour of 'partial equilibrium' solutions in which progress has 
been made on a limited number of fronts. Yet partial equilibrium solutions in 
one area can aggravate problems in other areas. For example, the use of fiscal 
incentives to promote non-traditional exports undermines the fiscal position; 
rapid trade liberalisation (through tariff reductions) can also weaken 
government revenue; the commitment to a stable REER damages price stability, 
and so on. 
The public external debt also proved to be an obstacle in the path of 
successful stabilisation for much of the past decade. At best a time-consuming 
distraction for hard-pressed government officials, the public sector's purchases 
of scarce foreign exchange to service foreign debt have distorted government 
expenditures while widening balance of payments current account deficits. 
Although the burden of the public external debt has not been as severe in 
Central America as in some other Latin American republics, it has to be 
remembered that the region has been extremely ill-equipped to cope with even 
a modest debt problem - let alone a major debt crisis. 
Finally, there has been conflict between adjustment and stabilisation 
programmes themselves. With the renewal of growth becoming the overriding 
priority throughout the region and with adjustment needed to underpin stable 
and high growth rates, there has been an understandable desire to launch 
adjustment programmes before the process of stabilisation has been completed. 
These programmes, with their emphasis on a change in relative prices to 
encourage resources to shift into new activities, and the adoption of appropriate 
incentives, can aggravate stabilisation problems - as Costa Rica has found to 
her cost on numerous occasions in the last decade. 
The above analysis of the failures and disappointments of stabilisation and 
adjustment programmes suggests that a key problem is the inconsistency which 
arises from trying to do too much too quickly. The crisis in Central America 
has so many dimensions that it is easy to lose sight of the main priorities. 
Furthermore, the crisis has affected the confidence of the policy-making elite 
in all republics, leaving them vulnerable to pressure from outside interests. 
These pressures have led to a widening of the reform agenda in directions 
which might be desirable under more normal circumstances, but which - in the 
Central American context - create unrealistic expectations. 
The first priority is to subordinate stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
to a long-run growth model for the region. Such a model, outlined in the 
following sections, should have at least four dimensions: (a) the promotion of 
non-traditional exports to the rest of the world, (b) the recovery and 
strengthening of the CACM, (c) the exploitation of new opportunities for 
traditional exports arising from the formation of market economies in Eastern 
Europe and the move to a Single Domestic Market in the European Community, 
and (d) the broadening of the internal (national) market through a reduction in 
poverty and an improvement in income distribution. 
The design of stabilisation and adjustment programmes consistent with such 
a long-run model would have two crucial ingredients: fiscal policy and 
exchange rate policy. These are the two elements which any Central American 
republic ignores at its peril. Other items on the reform agenda (e.g. 
privatisation, deregulation and financial liberalisation) can be added once 
success has been achieved in the two priority areas. 
Prudent fiscal policy suggests modest budget deficits. With further 
expenditure cuts (except on debt service payments and defence) so hard to 
achieve, the emphasis must be put on raising revenue. Here the problem is NOT 
the introduction of an array of new taxes so much as the enforcement of 
existing taxes. Where tax reductions or exemptions are introduced as part of the 
incentives in adjustment programmes, they need to be matched by additional 
revenue from other sources. 
The need for fiscal discipline arises for a number of reasons. With nominal 
exchange rate devaluation expected for some years to come (see below), a tight 
fiscal policy is necessary to moderate the increase in domestic prices. At the 
same time, the need to broaden social expenditure through careful targeting of 
groups most in need will be self-defeating if the additional expenditure is 
financed through inflationary borrowing techniques. Tight fiscal policy cannot 
eliminate inflation in Central America, but loose fiscal policy - as Nicaragua 
has found to her cost - will certainly exacerbate inflationary pressures. 
The need to give priority to exchange rate policy arises from the crucial role 
which competitive exchange rates play in the promotion of exports. Thus, an 
initial devaluation of the REER needs to be followed by an exchange rate 
policy which at least maintains a stable real exchange rate. Unless exporters are 
confident that the REER will be stable or falling, they are most unlikely to 
undertake the investments required to shift resources towards the export sector. 
Other measures to promote exports will be ineffective unless exchange rate 
policy is consistent. 
Even a stable REER implies - in the Central American context - a rise in 
domestic prices as a result of nominal devaluations. Thus, price stability is not 
an option in the medium-term. New measures must be taken (including targeted 
social expenditure) to protect the poorest groups in society from the impact of 
price rises, so that a stable REER implies the use of some government 
subsidies. These will quickly lead to fiscal indiscipline unless matched by tax 
increases. Thus, exchange rate and fiscal policy need to complement each other 
and must be operated in harmony. 
Narrowing of the reform agenda in the first instance to fiscal and exchange 
rate policy may not sound very ambitious, but we have already seen the 
consequences of over-ambitious reform programmes. Once these two crucial 
areas of policy reform are established and credible, the reform agenda can be 
widened. Trade liberalisation should aim both to lower tariff protection and to 
reestablish the CET, while immediate steps need to be taken to eliminate all 
non-tariff barriers on trade within the CACM. Financial liberalisation should 
set positive real interest rates as a minimum goal and property rights for small 
farmers need to be strengthened as early as possible. 
Model Assumptions 
The framework within which each Central American country develops in the 
1990s will be affected by the regional and international outlook. These two 
dimensions (regional and international) will act as a crucial constraint on the 
pace and character of development in Central America in the next decade. It is 
therefore necessary to address these questions explicitly and to make clear what 
assumptions are being made. 
First, it is necessary to assume that at the regional level Central America 
moves towards peace. This is a critical assumption. Without peace in the 
region, there is little possibility of growth, and development will continue to be 
distorted by the needs of a war economy. Fortunately, this assumption has 
become much more realistic at the beginning of the 1990s with the disbandment 
of the contras in Nicaragua, the negotiations towards an end to the civil war in 
El Salvador and the initiation of a process of dialogue in Guatemala. Although 
much progress remains to be made, the prospects for genuine and lasting peace 
are better than at any time in the last decade. The Bush administration has 
shown itself more flexible in its relations with Central America than its 
predecessor, the end of the Cold War has undermined the alleged Soviet threat 
and the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in February 1990 has 
removed a major source of regional tension. 
The implications of this assumption are enormous. It means that the 
allocation of public investment and new spending on social infrastructure can 
be determined by economic rather than military considerations. It also means 
that the huge numbers of Central Americans currently displaced within the 
region can begin to return to their original homes and that the size of the armed 
forces can be reduced with a corresponding addition to the productive labour 
force. 
However, the assumption of peace also means that some of the international 
capital flows which have helped to finance the balance of payments current 
account deficits in the 1980s will cease. Those loans or grants given to the 
region for geopolitical reasons will decline in importance as regional tensions 
diminish. This is true both of support given by some western countries and of 
the support given to Nicaragua by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, events in 
Eastern Europe will not only lead to a reduction in aid from some countries to 
Nicaragua, but will also lead to competition for scarce resources since there is 
no guarantee that funds for Eastern Europe will necessarily be additional to 
those allocated to other regions by the major aid donors. 
The balance of payments position in the 1980s is summarised in Table 4. 
With the exception of Nicaragua, most countries ran a small deficit on 
merchandise trade. The current account deficit, however, was generally much 
larger since interest payments on debt and other service payments were not 
matched by net receipts of transfers; the exception is El Salvador, where net 
transfers have been the most important source of balance of payments support 
as a result of remittances and US aid. Private capital flows, whether direct or 
portfolio, were generally unimportant (see Table 4) so that the current account 
deficit had to be financed in the main by net capital inflows. 
The deficit on merchandise trade in the 1990s will need to increase if Central 
America is going to recover the living standards of the late 1970s. This is true 
despite an expected improvement in export earnings, since the marginal 
propensity to import remains and will remain very high. Thus, for the five 
republics taken together the annual merchandise deficit consistent with 
economic recovery in the 1990s is likely to be between $1.5 and $2 billion, 
implying an increase in the merchandise deficit of around $1 billion. This is a 
substantial increase which will not be easy to finance, although any failure to 
do so is likely to result in a reduction in the pace of economic recovery. It 
therefore raises the question of how it can be funded. 
One source of relief is likely to be debt reduction by commercial banks. 
Whether this comes to Central America as part of a solution under the Brady 
Plan (as has recently been negotiated for Costa Rica) or through a package put 
together by the United Nations-sponsored Programa Especial para 
Centroamerica (PEC) does not matter; in addition, as part of the debt 
negotiations, interest payments on the debt will decline either through reduction 
of the principal or through reduction of interest rates or both. 
A price will have to be paid, however, for debt reduction. The bigger the 
discount, the more unlikely that the commercial banks will play a significant 
part in the reconstruction of Central America in the future. This is not an 
argument against debt reduction, since the commercial banks have shown that 
they are most reluctant to play a significant role in the region even without debt 
relief, but it does mean that Central America cannot rely on the banks to 
provide the balance of payments support which a long-run model is likely to 
require. Furthermore, the interest payments in Table 4 are largely theoretical 
since they represent the interest owed rather than the interest paid; in practice, 
by the end of the 1980s arrears of both principal and interest payments were 
substantial in the case of all Central American republics so that any debt relief 
negotiated with commercial banks is not likely to make much difference to 
actual payments. 

Another area of debt relief is through negotiations with the Paris Club of 
official creditors. Until recently, the Paris Club had extended debt relief only 
to African countries; however, early in 1990 the principle was extended to 
Bolivia so that Central America may be eligible in the 1990s for some 
reduction of debt service payments owed to official creditors. Since debt owed 
to official creditors has been serviced more promptly than debt owed to private 
creditors, debt relief under the aegis of the Paris Club could bring a genuine 
saving of foreign exchange and reduce, ceteris paribus, the size of the current 
account deficit needing to be financed by net capital flows. 
The size of the region's annual current account deficit will be determined 
primarily by changes in the merchandise balance, interest payments and net 
receipts of transfers; while official transfers may decline - since some of the 
payments are determined by security considerations - private transfers may 
increase since they are determined above all by the level of remittances. Thus, 
it is safest to assume no change in net receipts of transfers so that the increase 
in the annual current account deficit in the 1990s consistent with economic 
recovery can be set at around $800 million. This can only be financed if there 
is an increase in capital inflows. 
An increase can certainly be expected in direct foreign investment (DFI). 
This item in the balance of payments suffered grievously in the last decade (see 
Table 4) as a result of the economic crisis on the one hand and political 
instability on the other. In the superior economic and political climate of the 
1990s, underpinned by policies designed to promote exports, it is safe to predict 
that DFI will recover. However, too much should not be read into this. The 
base flows for DFI are so low that even a sharp recovery in percentage terms 
will not be sufficient to solve the financing problem. The most realistic 
assumption is that the proportion of the current account deficit financed by DFI 
will slowly rise in the 1990s, leading to an average annual increase of $200 
million in the inflow. 
Other private capital flows will remain relatively unimportant in the 1990s, 
although they can be expected to rise from their present negligible levels. Some 
republics (particularly Costa Rica) may be able to issue bonds on the 
international market and may even attract a small amount of international 
capital into the stock market. Most of the increase, however, will come in the 
form of trade credits on a short-term basis. 
Multilateral official capital flows, already of considerable importance in the 
1980s, should rise further in the next decade. Loans from the international 
multilateral agencies are essential for the task of reconstruction and the 
prospects are good for an increase from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) now that its capital base has been enlarged. There is also the prospect of 
an increase in grants from the European Community under the Cooperation 
Agreement.13 Although some bilateral official capital flows are set to decline 
in the 1990s for the reasons given above, there are also some donors (e.g. 
Japan) which can be expected to increase their Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to the region. Furthermore, the US administration has restored its aid 
programme for Nicaragua, following the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 
elections, and Nicaragua is also attracting loans from multilateral agencies for 
the first time in nearly ten years.14 Taken together, official capital flows 
(multilateral and bilateral) should increase to fill the remaining gap in the 
current account deficit. 
There is one other financial flow - capital flight - which is of great 
importance for the Central American balance of payments. The adoption of 
more and more stringent exchange controls in the 1980s has slowed down, but 
not eliminated, capital flight from Central America. That raises the question of 
whether and under what circumstances capital repatriation (i.e. the reversal of 
capital flight) might take place. 
It would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on capital repatriation. 
The general consensus is that capital repatriation plays a following rather than 
leading role in economic recovery; thus, when a recovery is underway, some 
reversal of capital flight can be expected; but capital repatriation will not 
initiate the process of recovery.15 
This conclusion is also likely to be correct for Central America. Thus, the 
new model of development should not rest on the assumption of capital 
repatriation. If the model is successful, some capital will return, but that is an 
added bonus which should not be built into the original calculations. 
These highly speculative remarks about international financial flows lead to 
the conclusion that additional balance of payments support will be available for 
Central America in the 1990s. However, it is most unlikely to be on such a 
massive scale that the balance of payments ceases to be a constraint. Thus, 
policies to earn foreign exchange through export promotion are going to be 
very important and it is appropriate to turn attention to the international 
environment in which export promotion will take place in the 1990s. 
Central America is a region which has been, and remains, very open to 
international trade. This means the international environment affects the level 
and rate of change of the economy in numerous ways. These include the world 
market conditions for primary products, the opportunities for non-traditional 
exports, the international technology frontier and the transfer of technology, the 
role of multinational companies (MNEs) and trade in services. 
Exports of primary products, for many decades the engine of growth in 
Central America, are sold at foreign prices determined in world markets; in 
addition, several key exports are subject to quotas agreed internationally. World 
demand is determined by the income elasticity together with price substitution 
effects. Thus, prices, quotas and elasticities (price and income) combine with 
world income to produce the global demand for each primary product and 
together with current market shares offer a first approximation to Central 
America's participation in the world market in the 1990s. 
There is almost universal agreement that the outlook for the main primary 
products exported by Central America (with the exception of bananas) are not 
particularly favourable. It is still possible for primary product exports from the 
region to perform dynamically through an increase in world market share; 
indeed, the collapse of quotas for coffee was greeted by some producers as a 
golden opportunity to increase Central America's share of world coffee 
exports.16 However, even if supply constraints are ignored, this opportunity 
should not be exaggerated. Coffee quotas will eventually be reestablished and 
sales to non-quota countries may then be subject to greater restrictions. Only 
in the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador, where the main task is to rebuild 
market share lost in the last ten years, can traditional primary products be 
expected to play a dynamic role. 
There are, of course, a number of possibly favourable developments for 
traditional primary products. The failure to reach an agreement in the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations at the end of 1990 was a severe setback, but the 
developed countries have returned to the negotiating table rather than risk the 
consequences of a major trade war. GATT, to which all five Central American 
republics either belong or have applied to join, should be strengthened as a 
result with improved mechanisms for eliminating arbitrary (and unilateral) 
import restrictions on agricultural and agro-industrial products. The Uruguay 
Round still holds out the prospect of a reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers 
for tropical products in the main consuming countries. The formation of a 
Single Domestic Market in the European Community (EC) by 1993 means that 
the 12 EC countries must harmonise their treatment of imports (e.g. bananas) 
and that is likely to lead to a lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
average.17 The EC has also offered to extend to Central America the excise 
duty and tariff concessions offered in 1990 to the Andean countries for 
commodity exports. The Eastern European market is now opening up through 
trade liberalisation. One should not disparage these efforts, but their 
quantitative impact is likely to be small because the barriers are already low in 
most cases. 
The most realistic assumption, therefore, is for slow growth (one to two per 
cent per annum) in the volume of Central America's traditional primary product 
exports. Prices will no doubt also rise from their current low levels, but no 
major boost should be expected from improvements in the net barter terms of 
trade (NBTT) over the long-run. Indeed, taking the medium-term period up to 
1993, the Sanford Commission worked on the assumption of a small 
deterioration in the NBTT and there is no compelling reason to quarrel with this 
even for the rest of the decade.18 
In the case of non-traditional exports (agricultural and industrial) sold 
outside the region, world prices, quotas (in some cases such as textiles), price 
and income elasticities are also important, but market shares play a special role. 
This is because of the preferential schemes for all developing countries on the 
one hand (e.g. the Generalised System of Preferences - GSP) and on the other 
the special schemes (e.g. the Caribbean Basin Initiative - CBI - and the 
European Community's Cooperation Agreement) in which Central America can 
participate. The existence of these special schemes makes it easier to think of 
an increase in the region's market share over the next decade as feasible even 
if world market conditions are unfavourable. 
An extension of the CBI has now been negotiated. Perhaps as important, an 
effort has been made to define its rules so that countervailing duties cannot be 
applied as arbitrarily as in the past (e.g. Costa Rica's cut flowers19). 
Nicaragua, following the election of President Violeta Chamorro and the defeat 
of the Sandinistas, has been made a beneficiary of the CBI and the US trade 
embargo against Nicaragua - in force since 1985 - has also been terminated. 
The European Community, a wealthy market of over 300 million consumers, 
is still almost virgin territory for Central America's non-traditional exports. The 
Lome Convention, signed between the EC and some 70 developing countries 
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, discriminates against Central America 
by offering special privileges to the Lome signatories20, but the Cooperation 
Agreement signed with Central America in 1985 offers the prospect (so far 
largely unrealised) of eroding this discrimination through extending Lome-type 
privileges to the region. As the Cooperation Agreement begins to function more 
effectively, there is a good chance that in the 1990s access to the EC for non-
traditional exports will improve. This is the best way for Central America to 
combat the discrimination implied by Lome since there is now no chance of the 
region being made a beneficiary of the Convention; the recent admission of the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti to Lome was seen by the EC as a special case 
because of their geographical position and was explicitly not seen as a 
precedent for other small Latin American states. 
There is a widespread fear in many quarters that the formation of a Single 
Domestic Market (SDM) in the EC by 1993 will create a 'Fortress Europe' 
making it harder for third countries to export. These fears are greatly 
exaggerated. First, the legislation for the SDM requires the harmonisation of all 
tax and tariff rates for imports from third countries; in many cases of concern 
to Central America, these are already harmonised; where they are not, there is 
more likely to be a levelling down rather than a levelling up. Secondly, the 
formation of the SDM - indeed, its whole rationale - is expected to increase 
output and income per head. That will increase demand, particularly for those 
goods with high income elasticities. 
The danger of a 'Fortress Europe' lies much more in the field of high-
technology goods and international services; this could well be a problem for 
developed country suppliers of the EC, such as Japan and the United States, but 
it is only of peripheral interest to Central America. In the kinds of goods and 
services that Central America might export to the EC in the 1990s, market 
access should improve after 1992. Thus, the special schemes for non-traditional 
exports could work to Central America's advantage in the 1990s. In addition, 
world market conditions generally for such products are not unfavourable. The 
long-run shift in world trade in favour of manufactured exports by developing 
countries is expected to continue and planned changes in the GSP should help 
a region such as Central America. Of course, problems will remain and the 
arbitrary application of non-tariff barriers and countervailing duties is bound to 
continue in some cases. However, there are no easy options for the region and 
the crucial question is the balance of benefits over costs. Looking at the whole 
picture, the market conditions for non-traditional exports do not look 
unpromising. There is also the chance that trade liberalisation policies in some 
developing countries (e.g. Mexico) will create a number of export opportunities 
for Central America which previously were ruled out by tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, and there remains the distant promise of a free trade agreement with 
Mexico and the United States as a consequence of President Bush's Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative.21 
Finally, there is the question of trade in services. Almost irrespective of the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round of negotiations on international trade in 
services, this branch of world commerce is set to grow in the 1990s in both 
absolute and relative terms. There is a widespread feeling that trade in services 
(estimated at 20 per cent of world commerce) will be dominated by MNEs, 
leaving Central America at a comparative disadvantage with a heavy deficit in 
its balance of payments service account. This is very misleading; services 
consist of many different activities, in at least one of which (tourism) Central 
America has already shown its potential. Yet there are many others where 
Central America has cost advantages through its wage scales and geographical 
position; this question will be explored further below (see Trade with the Rest 
of the World). 
Objectives of the Model 
There is already a great deal of discussion about instruments (e.g. tariff policy) 
in Central America. A long-run model, however, requires targets as well as 
instruments and the targets determine the choice of instruments. So far, there 
has been much less discussion of targets than instruments and this has not 
helped to promote consistent economic policy. 
The first target must be the rapid growth of GDP per head. Whatever its 
deficiencies (and they are numerous), GDP per head will always be a rough 
proxy for living standards. In some countries (e.g. Costa Rica), rapid growth 
of GDP per head (two to three per cent per annum) throughout the next decade 
would take income per head to record levels; in others (e.g. Nicaragua), the best 
that can be hoped for is a recovery of income per head towards its level at the 
end of the 1970s. 
It is difficult to imagine an increase in living standards without an increase 
in GDP per head. However, the converse is not true. It is possible to imagine 
an increase in GDP per head which does not lead to a generalised increase in 
living standards. Indeed, there are plenty of examples from Central America's 
recent past. Thus, a second target must be an improvement in the distribution 
of income through a reduction of poverty. 
This target has acquired particular importance in Central America in the last 
decade. Income distribution, already highly unequal in the late 1970s, has 
become worse in the 1980s and the incidence of poverty has accelerated.22 No 
doubt the debate on the definition of poverty will continue for many years, but 
the conclusion that poverty is now more widespread in Central America is 
inescapable. 
A third target is self-sufficiency in basic grains at the regional level. This is 
a more controversial target. Some economists would argue that if a country can 
import rice or maize more cheaply than it can be produced locally, it should do 
so; the resources freed in this way can then be employed more productively 
elsewhere. This is a crucial policy issue, since it is well known that maize can 
be purchased more cheaply from Texas, for example, than it can be produced 
in Central America.23 
There are good reasons for resisting this application of the law of 
comparative advantage. The economic case for specialisation rests on the 
assumption that the resources released can be reemployed in activities which 
contribute directly or indirectly to exports to pay for increased imports. If 
specialisation leads to factor unemployment, the case is undermined. In the 
Central American context, large-scale farms producing basic grains could 
probably be switched to export crops without too much difficulty, but the same 
is not true of small-scale farms and the latter dominate the production of basic 
grains. 
The target of self-sufficiency in basic grains, however, can best be applied 
at the regional level. The goal is regional self-sufficiency leaving plenty of 
scope for free trade in basic grains within the Central American Common 
Market. Regional self-sufficiency gives large-scale farms the opportunity to 
profit from economies of scale, while offering some limited protection to small-
scale farms. 
The fourth target is an industrialisation project. Like self-sufficiency in basic 
grains, this is a controversial goal. Some would argue, for example, that if a 
country can achieve rising real GDP per head with a reduction in poverty 
without industrialisation, then there is no need for industrialisation; similarly, 
if real GDP and poverty targets are met through industrialisation, then that 
shows industry was a good instrument, but it does not make it a target. 
The reasons for thinking of industrialisation in the Central American context 
as a target are complex. First, it is very difficult to imagine the first two targets 
being met in the long-run without an industrialisation project; secondly, 
industry has demonstrated throughout the world that it is a particularly powerful 
medium for promoting capital accumulation and the transfer of technology. To 
capitalise on these advantages, Central America has to insert itself into the 
world economy with an industrialisation project tailored to its dynamic 
comparative advantage. Market forces will go some of the way towards 
defining this project, but rates of return on capital are so strongly affected by 
the matrix of policy decisions that market forces cannot be defined as objective. 
They are themselves subject to policy decisions and it is better to recognise this 
explicitly; thus, policy decisions should be subordinate to the industrialisation 
project and not the other way round; this can only be achieved if the 
industrialisation project is a target. 
An example from economic history will make this clearer. In the 19th 
century, Central America established its comparative advantage in coffee. 
Policy was not neutral, however, between coffee and other primary products; 
the Liberal reforms created a framework which favoured coffee in a hundred 
ways; the comparative advantage came from this framework ('the coffee 
project') and market forces did the rest; the rates of return on coffee, its value 
added and domestic currency price were the outcome of market forces, but 
those forces were shaped in large part by policies on land ownership, credit, 
interest rates, labour laws etc, all of which were subordinate to the goal of 
increasing coffee production. 
An industrialisation project does not mean the promotion of any or all 
industrial activity for its own sake. That would be very wasteful. What is 
required is a project which complements the other targets and reaps the 
potential benefits of capital accumulation within a framework which promotes 
long-run (dynamic) comparative advantage. I shall return to this point below. 
The fifth, and final, target is to narrow the technological gap between Central 
America and the rest of the world and to create a certain technological 
autonomy. Central America will, of course, remain a net importer of technology 
for many decades (if not for ever); however, the pace of global technical 
change has accelerated recently and promises to continue to do so in the 1990s. 
Countries or regions that must by and large import technology need an 
infrastructure that can adapt this technology to their own requirements; that 
means a more skilled labour force, a facility in design and engineering and-.a 
proper understanding of business administration and marketing. The 
construction of such a technological framework is the target for Central 
America in the 1990s. 
Constraints on the Model 
Short-run economic growth is usually determined by changes in demand. In the 
long-run, however, economic growth is determined by a number of constraints 
which limit the increase in supply. It is the purpose of this section to identify 
the main constraints which are likely to operate on the supply-side of the 
Central American economy in the 1990s. 
The most important constraint is likely to be the balance of payments. A 
given growth of real income implies an even faster growth of imports in the 
Central American context, with foreign exchange needed for new capital 
equipment, raw materials, consumer goods, technology payments and services. 
The foreign exchange is provided by exports and net capital inflows, but it is 
safe to predict that in the 1990s the marginal efficiency of foreign exchange 
will remain high. Thus, increasing foreign exchange receipts to relax the 
balance of payments constraint and, ceteris paribus, permit a faster growth is 
a high priority. 
The supply of energy is likely to be a further constraint on the long-run 
model. Forecasts of the energy balance suggest a gap between supply and 
demand in the 1990s even with fairly modest estimates of the growth of 
demand.24 Measures to increase supply (e.g. of hydroelectricity) are often very 
time-consuming as well as expensive. Furthermore, forecasts of supply do not 
take into account the possible decline due to environmental damage leading to 
lower water levels and silting in lakes. 
If the forecast energy balances are taken literally, they imply a major 
reduction in the feasible long-run rate of growth in Central America. The 
energy balance is a very serious problem, but it is probably not the knife-edge 
problem implied by the forecasts. First, many businesses have built up their 
own generating capacity as a response to shortages and disruptions in public 
supply; this capacity very often does not show up in statistics, but can be used 
to supplement supply. Secondly, energy capacity can be increased quickly in 
the short-run through oil-burning plants; this adds further pressure to the 
balance of payments constraint, but it is a feasible (if costly) option. 
These qualifications to the imbalance often forecast between energy supply 
and demand in the long-run do not imply that the sector can be neglected. On 
contrary, it is a matter of urgency to take steps now to increase supply in the 
medium- to long-term. It is encouraging to note the importance attached to this 
problem in the PEC.25 
The third constraint on the model is the environment. It is now recognised 
that Central America's pre-1980 economic growth was achieved to some extent 
at the expense of the environment. The cost has been destruction of forests 
without replanting, pollution of lakes and rivers and coastlines and a decline in 
annual rainfalls in some parts of the region. The growth of the 1990s must take 
into account the impact of new projects on the environment through an 
accounting approach which puts a monetary cost on environmental damage. 
Projects should only be supported if the net discounted value of all benefits 
exceed the economic and environmental costs.26 In effect, the community 
should be asked to treat the environment like a capital good which is 
maintained in good order through an annual programme of repair and 
maintenance achieved through a depreciation charge on the national accounts. 
Although the need for an ecological dimension to growth is widely 
acknowledged, it is not so easy to achieve. Societies, including those in Central 
America, have for centuries regarded the environment as a free good to be 
consumed at will. The adoption of an environmental constraint implies either 
a reduction of growth or an increase in cost; since Central America cannot 
afford to reduce growth, this means that costs will rise and that raises the 
question of who will pay. The beneficiaries of environmental improvement are 
not only national (in this case Central Americans), but also foreigners (pollution 
knows no frontiers). It is a problem which free markets are not well placed to 
solve, but one which will have to be addressed in Central America.27 
The fourth constraint is likely to be provided by the conditionality of foreign 
lending. Conditionality is not usually mentioned in a list of constraints, but it 
has become very important in the Central American context and is likely to 
become more important in the 1990s. There are three reasons for this. First, I 
have argued above for an increase in foreign lending to the region and there is 
a loose connection between the extent of conditionality and the volume of 
borrowing; secondly, as more normal conditions return to Central America, 
lenders will be more inclined to attach conditions to loans that increase the 
chance of repayment; thirdly, the additional lending to the region will fall 
disproportionately on official multilateral sources, which have shown 
themselves to be the keenest on applying conditions.28 
Everyone accepts the need for some kind of conditionality, but there comes 
a point where conditionality represents an unacceptable restriction on national 
sovereignty. This is a problem not only for Central America, but also for many 
other developing countries. However, it is likely to be a particularly sensitive 
problem for Central America as there will be so many donors in the 1990s, 
each with different priorities and some with different ideologies. 
There is no easy answer to this problem, but one golden rule applies. If a 
country receives a loan to support the balance of payments, it is appropriate that 
conditions are attached which increase the likelihood of an improvement in the 
balance of payments; what is not appropriate is the attachment of conditions 
which the donor would like to see adopted, but which are largely irrelevant as 
far as the balance of payments are concerned. If donors and recipients stuck to 
this basic rule, not all the problems of conditionality would be solved but it 
would remove some of the ill-feeling. 
A fifth constraint on the model is likely to come from the financial system. 
There can be no economic development in Central America without an increase 
in the rate of investment (expressed as a percentage of GDP). Part of the 
increase can be paid for by an increase in foreign borrowing; furthermore, the 
reactivation of the economy will permit a recovery in reinvested profits. 
Nevertheless, part of the increase will have to come from an increase in 
domestic savings.29 
This creates two special problems. First, failure to improve the financial 
system in a manner that increases voluntary savings runs the risk of 
encouraging forced savings through an acceleration of inflation. This has been 
particularly evident in Nicaragua where the inflation tax in the 1980s became 
one of the main sources of government revenue. From the experience of the last 
decade, we can see that the extent of poverty is very sensitive to the rate of 
inflation; the poor in Central America suffer most from an acceleration of 
inflation and an increase in the 1990s is not acceptable. Secondly, the 
traditional mechanism for increasing domestic savings - an increase in income 
inequality - is also not acceptable in Central America. New sources must be 
tapped through a variety of new instruments - including the capturing of 
remittances by the banking system. 
The final constraint on the model is the educational system. The training of 
Central America's human resources was far from adequate at the end of the 
1970s, with the notable exception of Costa Rica. In the 1980s, the educational 
system has declined dramatically in quality as the economic crisis took its toll. 
The economic model for the 1990s and beyond requires a more skilled labour 
force with greater flexibility, greater numeracy and - above all - greater 
literacy. The restoration, improvement and extension of the educational system 
is a matter of pressing concern.30 
A Counterfactual Experiment 
A long-run model for Central America must be designed in such a way as to 
take advantage of research already completed, the experience of the past and 
the ideas of other interested groups. There is a danger in this approach, 
however, because the proposed model may be unduly influenced by previous 
work; the purpose of the model is to find the instruments which can satisfy the 
goals in a manner consistent with the constraints. Other work on long-run 
development in Central America may start from different goals to those 
outlined above or may be bound by different constraints. 
In this section, therefore, a counterfactual experiment is adopted. In this 
experiment, there are assumed to be no previously existing models; there are 
no international agencies such as the World Bank or the IMF. The purpose of 
the experiment is to explore the logical characteristics of a long-run model 
which satisfies the goals and constraints outlined above. 
For any given Central American country, there are three sources of demand: 
internal (i.e. national), regional (i.e. the rest of Central America) and foreign 
(i.e. the rest of the world). The first question, therefore, refers to the priority to 
be given to each source of demand. 
A model which began with an expansion of the internal market (e.g. through 
income redistribution) might appear to meet many of the goals, but would 
rapidly violate the balance of payments constraint. In the context of the 1990s, 
allowing for the expected capital flows, a model which began with an increase 
in internal demand would soon fail. The direct and indirect import content of 
the consumption pattern of the lower income groups, let alone the higher 
income groups, is too high to permit a significant expansion, ceteris paribus, 
of internal demand. 
A model which gave priority to regional demand would also violate the 
balance of payments constraint, although for different reasons. For the region 
as a whole, intraregional exports and imports are equal. However, the 
extraregional imports associated with an expansion of intraregional trade are 
very high; at the very least, the coefficient is 0.3 and this could rise to 0.5 when 
indirect capital costs, royalty payments and profit remittances are taken into 
account.31 Of course, intraregional trade expansion is also saving foreign 
exchange through regional import substitution. However, the expansion of 
intraregional trade stimulates the non-trade sector, encouraging further imports 
directly and indirectly, and may undermine extraregional export earnings 
through changes in relative prices. Thus, a model which relied, ceteris paribus, 
on an expansion of regional demand would also soon violate the balance of 
payments constraint. 
Internal and regional demand are, to some extent, under the control of the 
authorities. Foreign demand is not. Thus, a model giving priority to foreign 
demand is in fact a model giving priority to the increase of regional supply for 
foreign markets. Clearly, such a model would not violate the balance of 
payments constraint; on the contrary, the increase in export earnings - net of 
additional imports required directly and indirectly by export expansion - will 
ease the balance of payments constraint. 
However, a policy of giving priority to foreign demand will, ceteris paribus, 
face other problems. There is a very real danger, in the Central American 
context, that the instruments used to promote extraregional exports, e.g. 
unilateral tariff reductions, will discriminate against intraregional trade. Since 
intraregional trade is dominated by manufactured goods, the policy of 
promoting extraregional exports may undermine the goal of an industrialisation 
project. If the new exports to the rest of the world are industrial, this might not 
matter; if, however, they are agricultural products or the products of 
maquiladoras32, this could leave the goal of an industrialisation project 
seriously weakened. 
It is not only regional demand that may be undermined by a policy of giving 
priority to extraregional exports. The need to shift resources towards the export 
sector and to provide an attractive rate of return for domestic and foreign 
capital can undermine the internal market through a growing concentration of 
income and wealth. This violates the goal of improving income distribution 
through a reduction of poverty. 
One would have to be very naive not to recognise that these conflicts 
between foreign demand on the one hand and regional/national demand on the 
other can occur in practice. In Central America, for example, export promotion 
is increasingly being pursued through a policy of unilateral tariff reductions, in 
violation of regional treaties, which has turned CACM from a Customs Union 
into a Free Trade Zone.33 Similarly, Costa Rica's spectacular success with 
non-traditional exports has been achieved, it is generally agreed, through a 
sharp concentration of income.34 
It seems, therefore, that the long-run model faces an awkward choice; the 
logic of the Central American economies, in particular the balance of payments 
constraint, suggests giving priority to foreign demand, but giving priority to 
foreign demand appears to run the risk of violating some of the objectives set 
out above. 
Faced with this choice, some modellers appear to be willing to abandon all 
goals other than maximisation of the rate of growth of real GDP per head;35 
this, at least, is consistent, but it is also defeatist. Furthermore, the objectives 
outlined above are not optional extras; they are essential ingredients for Central 
America's long-run economic development. 
Fortunately, it is possible to resolve this dilemma. Priority needs to be given 
to foreign demand in such a way that it is complementary with the expansion 
of regional demand and the internal market. This is difficult, but - as we shall 
see - not impossible. At present, the outward-looking policies adopted to 
promote trade liberalisation far too often have undermined rather than 
complemented the two other sources of demand. 
Thus, the issue for Central America is not whether or not to have an apertura 
through outward-looking trade policies. The issue is what kind of apertura and, 
in particular, the need to select instruments in such a way that they do not 
undermine the other sources of demand nor violate the goals of the long-run 
model. 

Policies and Instruments 
There is a frequent, albeit understandable, tendency in economics to use the 
words 'policies' and 'instruments' interchangeably. For many purposes, there 
is no need to distinguish the two, but it is necessary in this context. Policies 
refer to strategies which the authorities try to achieve through the manipulation 
of instruments; thus, for example, the authorities change the exchange rate (an 
instrument) in the hope that this will promote non-traditional exports (a policy). 
While the authorities undoubtedly control the instruments, there is much less 
control over the policies. 
In this section, the instruments relevant for the policies required by a long-
run model for Central America are outlined. This is done by means of a matrix 
(see Table 5) with policies in the columns and instruments in the row. Each 
instrument can then be assessed in terms of its likely impact on each policy; a 
grading system is used from three (a weak effect) to one ( a strong effect). 
Clearly, these judgements are subjective, but they are not arbitrary. The grading 
system is intended to reflect the conclusions of the economics profession on the 
efficacy of various instruments in the Central American context. 
The first five columns refer to policies for increasing exports to the rest of 
the world. The first column refers to traditional exports, which in the Central 
American context means the 'famous five' (coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar and 
beef); some non-traditional exports (e.g. cardamom from Guatemala) are now 
showing many characteristics of traditional exports, but the distinction is so 
well-established in the region that it is preferable not to change the list of 
traditional exports. 
The next three columns refer to non-traditional exports of goods to the rest 
of the world (ROW). The three kinds of goods are agricultural, manufactured 
(including agro-industrial) and the products of maquiladoras. All too often no 
distinction is made between these three kinds of non-traditional exports, 
although each has very different implications for the goals of the long-run 
model and each is likely to affect the constraints in different ways. 
The fifth column refers to exports of services to ROW. Although almost 
everyone acknowledges the promising future which Central American tourism 
(a service to ROW) offers in the long-run, many are inclined to argue that the 
comparative advantage in service exports will remain with the advanced 
industrial countries in the 1990s. At the global level, it is no doubt true that a 
shift is taking place in the international division of labour which favours 
exports of manufactured goods by developing countries and of services by 
developed countries. However, at the regional level it is possible to identify 
many service exports (in addition to tourism) which could profitably be 
exploited by Central America. This point will be explored in the next section. 
Columns six and seven of Table 5 refer to the regional market (CACM). The 
first of the two columns refers to a policy of increased trade in manufactured 
goods; this includes the well-known policy of regional import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI), so successful in the 1960s, but it also includes any policy 
for promoting intraregional trade in manufactured goods, including agro-
industrial products. The second of the two columns refers to intraregional trade 
in agricultural products; this includes, for example, trade in basic grains as well 
as trade in raw materials. 
The final two columns refer to policies designed to widen the internal 
market. The first refers to policies to widen the market without national import 
substitution (e.g. poverty reduction through rural public works), while the 
second refers to policies to widen the internal market through import 
substitution at the national level. 
The rows of Table 5 contain details on the instruments available. In the 
interests of completeness, a distinction must be made between those instruments 
controlled by the domestic or regional authorities and those controlled by the 
rest of the world. The latter list, of course, is far from complete, but a number 
of instruments are mentioned which have an important bearing on the policies 
in the columns and which are not controlled by authorities in Central America. 
Examples are the quotas for traditional exports to ROW, non-tariff barriers 
applied to non-traditional exports by advanced industrial countries and the 
transfer of international technology. 
The other instruments are all assumed to be subject to control by the 
domestic or regional authorities. In some cases this is uncontroversial (e.g. 
nominal exchange rates and minimum wage rates). In other cases (e.g. Direct 
Foreign Investment - DFI), it is only partly true since the actual flow of DFI 
depends on a host of factors only some of which are controlled by the 
authorities. Furthermore, many of the instruments (e.g. tariffs) are increasingly 
subject to conditions agreed with international agencies and therefore not 
entirely in the hands of governments. Nevertheless, the decisions of the 
authorities have an important bearing on each of the instruments listed in the 
first nine rows of the table. 
The instruments, in turn, affect the policies and their effect varies from weak 
to strong. For example, in the case of the exchange rate, a real depreciation is 
likely to have a strong effect (1) on non-traditional exports to ROW and on 
national ISI; it is expected to have a moderate effect (2) on traditional exports 
and on exports to the regional market, and only a weak effect (3) on widening 
the internal market through means other than national ISI. On the other hand, 
in the case of tariffs, a reduction in nominal tariff rates is expected to have a 
weak effect (3) on traditional exports, service exports and widening of the 
national market and a strong effect (1) on all other policies. 
The three 'financial' instruments (credit, DFI and interest rates) are assumed 
to have a variety of impacts on the different policies. An increase in credit, for 
example, is expected to have a strong effect (1) on the first three policies and 
on widening the national market, but only a weak effect (3) on exports of 
maquiladoras. By contrast, an increased flow of DFI is likely to have a strong 
effect (1) on exports from maquiladoras and on service exports. The interest 
rate instrument is expected to have a moderate effect (2) in all cases except 
maquila and regional exports of agricultural goods, where it is assumed to have 
a weak effect (3). 
The three 'fiscal' instruments (minimum wage rate, government expenditure 
and tax rates) are all assumed to have strong effects on widening the national 
market; the minimum wage rate is also expected to have a strong effect (1) on 
maquiladoras, a weak effect (3) on regional ISI and a moderate effect (2) in 
most other cases. Finally, institutional change is seen as particularly important 
in the case of the two regional market policies, but of less importance in respect 
of all other policies. 
The table also makes clear the impact of the foreign-controlled instruments 
on the policies. For example, non-tariff barriers erected by advanced industrial 
countries are expected to have a strong effect on the three kinds of non-
traditional exports to ROW, a moderate effect on traditional exports and a weak 
effect elsewhere (including exports of services). 
Looking down the columns of Table 5 gives a first idea of what is required 
to promote a particular policy. In some cases this is clearly more difficult than 
in others; for example, in the case of traditional exports, there are only three 
instruments identified with strong effects and two are controlled by foreigners. 
On the other hand, in the case of the maquila industry, there are five 
instruments identified with strong effects and four are assumed to be subject to 
domestic or regional control. 
We can now turn to possible conflicts between instruments and policies. For 
example, in the case of tariff reductions, there will be a strong effect on non-
traditional exports to the rest of the world and on regional exports, but the 
effects will be in opposite directions. In the first case, exports will be promoted 
and in the second they will be undermined. Thus, the choice of instruments has 
to be made in terms of the chosen mix of policies and not just in terms of a 
single policy. Similarly, an increase in minimum wage rates will widen the 
national market, but will undermine exports from maquiladoras. 
In formal modelling terms, the problem can be described as follows: there 
is an objective function containing five dimensions (see the objectives above), 
which must be maximised subject to the constraints. This must be done by 
selecting and setting the instruments described in this section in an optimal 
fashion, where 'optimal' simply means that the combination of instruments 
achieves the highest value of the objective function consistent with the 
constraints. 
This is a very familiar problem in linear - or quadratic - programming. The 
problems associated with this kind of approach, however, are in practice 
formidable. In the remaining sections, therefore, the kind of approach which 
should guide policy-makers in trying to resolve this problem in practice will be 
outlined. The problem remains the same, however, since the focus is on trying 
to find instruments which can maximise the goals of the model without 
violating the constraints. The approach here is qualitative, therefore, rather than 
quantitative, although in principle the two approaches should give the same 
results. 
Trade with the Rest of the World 
Trade liberalisation in Central America requires apertura policies which 
complement, rather than undermine, the regional and domestic markets. Given 
the obstacles facing traditional exports, these apertura policies are primarily 
directed at non-traditional exports of goods and services. This does not mean 
that traditional exports are expected to decline in absolute terms - indeed, a 
modest increase in value and volume is possible - but it does mean that they are 
expected to decline in relative terms as a proportion of total exports and as a 
proportion of GDP. 
There is no doubt that export promotion requires apertura policies, but there 
are still many ways in which apertura policies can combine to promote exports 
and some of these ways are more likely than others to be consistent with the 
goals of the long-run model. As a first step, it is necessary to distinguish 
between apertura policies which are rapid and those which are gradual; it is 
also necessary to distinguish between those which are indiscriminate and those 
which are selective. 
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RAPID (1) (3) 
GRADUAL (2) (4) 
The first option (1), rapid and indiscriminate apertura policies, implies a 
swift reduction of tariff rates, a flexible exchange rate and a liberalisation of 
interest rates; the free market is left to determine the allocation of resources and 
comparative advantage is 'revealed' by those activities which do best under the 
new rules of the game; comparative disadvantage, by contrast, is revealed by 
those activities which are forced to close. The second option (2) is similar to 
the first, except that tariff reductions are introduced gradually and other 
instruments (e.g. credit controls) which have influenced the allocation of 
resources are phased out slowly. 
The third option (3), rapid and selective apertura policies, assumes that the 
authorities do not wish to promote all export activities equally. Thus, the 
instruments are changed rapidly, but in such a way as to favour certain sectors 
more than others. The free market is now not the only determinant of 
comparative advantage and the authorities are forced to adopt a position on the 
difficult question of where the country's long-run comparative advantage is 
thought to lie. The fourth option (4) is similar to the third, except that the 
instruments of trade liberalisation are assumed to be introduced gradually rather 
than rapidly. 
The first question to be answered is whether, in the Central American 
context, apertura policies should be rapid or gradual. A rapid apertura has the 
advantage that interested parties do not have time to form pressure groups to 
distort the liberalisation process; it is a form of shock treatment which under 
the right conditions can achieve a very sharp increase in efficiency and 
productivity in certain activities. However, these conditions are unlikely to be 
found in Central America. In particular, a rapid apertura without a prior 
process of industrial modernisation (reconversion industrial) is likely to lead 
to factory closures and a decline in the industrial base. Indeed, it is not difficult 
to imagine many industrialists responding to a rapid apertura by converting 
their factories into import businesses. 
Some activities would undoubtedly prosper even in Central America from a 
rapid apertura. The combination of lower tariffs on imported inputs coupled 
with a competitive exchange rate works to the advantage of non-traditional 
agricultural exports, since they are not at risk from competing imports and there 
are few barriers to entry for new firms. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of 
maquiladoras, where barriers to entry - at least for domestic firms - tend to be 
higher because of the capital requirements and the need for information on 
export markets. 
However, an apertura that is gradual would still favour these two groups 
without subjecting the weak industrial base to the same pressures. Given the 
need for reconversion industrial36, for training the labour force in new skills 
and for learning about foreign markets, the gradual introduction of liberalisation 
policies is likely to be optimal in Central America. That means phasing in over 
a number of years the tariff reductions and exchange rate changes etc. that are 
needed to implement an apertura policy. Of course, even a gradual apertura 
cannot safeguard all the firms in the industrial base and the most inefficient will 
be forced to close, but some firms which would otherwise be forced out of 
business will be given the chance to become internationally competitive. 
The second question is whether the apertura should be indiscriminate or 
selective. An indiscriminate apertura has the advantage that the authorities do 
not have to become involved in picking winners. The free market decides and 
long-run comparative advantage is determined by short-run response to the new 
vector of prices. 
Indiscriminate apertura policies, however, suffer from a number of 
disadvantages. There is no guarantee that the new exports will be consistent 
with the goals of the long-run model; for example, none of the products need 
be industrial and they could all come from activities requiring very little 
unskilled labour; the non-traditional export sector could still be very dynamic, 
but it could be moving the economy in a direction which runs counter to the 
stated goals. 
Another problem has to do with short-run versus long-run comparative 
advantage. It may be in a country's short-term interests, for example, to 
welcome new exports based on cheap labour taking advantage of some 
international trade concession of a temporary nature. Clearly, this is a very 
risky strategy in the long-run, since by definition the trade concession is 
temporary and there is always some other country which can provide even 
cheaper labour. Also, a cheap labour strategy implies a policy of exchange rate 
devaluation which is likely to run counter to efforts to improve income 
distribution in the longer term. 
A third problem, very relevant in Central America, is the implications of an 
indiscriminate apertura policy for social infrastructure. Promotion of exports 
requires cooperation between the private and public sectors, with the latter 
providing the social infrastructure to remove various supply-side bottlenecks. 
An indiscriminate apertura can produce an export list* which requires public 
expenditure far in excess of what is required by a more selective list. A list of 
100 items of $1 million each has very different resource implications to a list 
of two items of $50 million each. 
It is worth remembering that each of the five main traditional exports in 
Central America was introduced in a selective fashion. The incentives for 
coffee producers in the 19th century (e.g. free land and coffee trees) were not 
available for other exporters;37 the concessions offered to the fruit companies 
at the turn of the century were only available for bananas; the introduction of 
cotton in the 1940s was made possible by public investments and credit policies 
designed to favour its export and similar support was provided for sugar and 
beef. A policy of selective apertura is therefore more consistent with Central 
American history and likely to avoid the disadvantages of an indiscriminate 
apertura. 
A selective apertura need not mean discriminatory tariffs. On the contrary, 
the construction of 'made to measure' tariffs is extremely difficult and fraught 
with problems. It is preferable that the element of selectivity is introduced 
through a coherent credit, interest rate, exchange rate and DFI policy which 
works in favour of the selected activities. It is, therefore, a policy in favour of 
particular (selected) activities rather than a policy discriminating against other 
(non-selected) activities. 
A selective apertura policy does require the selection of preferred activities 
and this should clearly be done in such a way as to be consistent with the goals 
of the long-run model. This is most likely to be achieved through activities in 
which the foreign market is complementary to the regional or domestic market. 
A good example is provided by agroindustries. Exports of agroindustrial 
products use intensively raw materials which are grown in the region; these raw 
materials are, or can be, produced by small-scale farmers or agricultural 
cooperatives in a way that makes a significant impact on the reduction of 
poverty; often the raw materials, and their processing, require the adaptation of 
foreign technology in a way which obliges firms to establish a limited research 
and development capability. Agroindustrial products are potentially a very 
lucrative market. Income elasticities for many such products are high and the 
new products are often not at risk from synthetic substitutes because the 
demand is for natural resource-based products. 
The long-run comparative advantage enjoyed by Central America in 
agroindustries is derived primarily from its natural resource base. For some 
countries (i.e. Costa Rica), it is also possible to select sectors for dynamic 
comparative advantage based on skill-intensive manufactured products; this 
advantage is derived from an educated labour force in which skills are rewarded 
in dollar terms at a fraction of their cost in advanced countries. These 
manufactured goods offer the prospect of significant backward and forward 
linkages, need a certain firm-level technological expertise and contribute to a 
widening of the internal market through the payment of wages and salaries 
which are high by local standards. 
Apertura policies which are gradual and selective - option (4) above - can 
also be applied to the service sector. The division of labour in international 
services is subject to many forces, but one is the quality and price of labour 
inputs domestically. The advance of technology has made possible trade in 
many services which were previously considered non-traded. A good example 
is the repair and maintenance of jet aircraft, which need not be carried out in 
the country or countries where the jets operate. Another example is data 
processing, which can be carried out far from the country to which the data 
refer. 
Central America also has yet to reap to the full the advantages of its 
geographic location between the Pacific and the Atlantic. The restoration of 
more normal conditions in Central America in the 1990s will allow decisions 
about a second inter-oceanic canal or a trans-isthmian oil pipeline to be taken 
in a calmer environment. Similarly Central America remains a potential 
bridgehead for transhipment of goods from South America to North America 
and its position on the edge of the Pacific rim should also not be overlooked. 
The scope for increasing exports of services, therefore, remains considerable. 
Regional Cooperation 
Regional cooperation (RC) includes the special case of regional integration 
(RI), but RC is broader than RI. It is important to remember this, since the five 
Central American republics do have an opportunity - as we shall see - to pursue 
cooperation in areas other than a formal customs union. 
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1981 152.3 304.8 186.4 118.3 210.6 972.4 
1982 112.3 260.8 219.9 86.8 108.6 788.4 
1983 120.1 233.1 229.3 104.7 121.1 808.3 
1984 114.8 251.4 186.5 99.0 70.8 722.5 
1985 92.6 216.7 99.4 75.0 64.0 547.7 
1986 106.2 161.0 102.4 58.1 42.6 470.3 
1987 116.8 181.3 132.0 60.3 37.7 528.1 
1988 119.3 197.5 148.4 63.0 36.8 565.0 
1989 137.6 200.9 166.9 62.7 31.2 599.3 
1990* 145.5 213.7 143.6 84.8 51.3 638.9 
* Preliminary results 
Source: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano, Boletin Estadistico 1990, San 
Jose, 1991, Cuadro No. 6 
It is true, however, that RI remains the most important feature of RC in 
Central America. Furthermore, after almost a decade of decline, there are signs 
that the Central American Common Market (CACM) has turned a corner (see 
Table 6). The value of officially recorded intraregional trade has been rising 
modestly since 1986,38 Honduras has announced its intention of rejoining 
CACM in the near future and the Camara de Compensation looks set to 
increase its role in the multilateral payments system39 as a result of the recent 
agreement between the Consejo Monetario Centroamericano and the European 
Community.40 
The future of the Central American Common Market, therefore, and indeed 
the whole project in favour of regional economic integration, is at present 
delicately poised. The decline of CACM in the 1980s, the most visible evidence 
of which has been the collapse of intraregional trade, was at first attributable 
to 'objective' forces such as the debt crisis; other 'subjective' forces, however, 
have also been involved which in some respects pose an even greater threat to 
the future of CACM. The forces in favour of integration were, until recently, 
very weak, but they have now become stronger and are being articulated more 
coherently. 
The CACM should be an essential part of the industrialisation process in 
Central America and should be seen as a complement to non-traditional exports 
to the rest of the world rather than as an alternative. The revival of the CACM, 
however, is by no means assured; not only are the forces in favour of 
disintegration very powerful, but there are also a series of barriers which have 
to be removed before the CACM can function efficiently. Merely removing the 
barriers blocking increased economic integration is not enough. A revival of the 
CACM along the lines followed in the 1960s is not sufficient; that model of 
economic integration is now redundant and what is required is a new kind of 
integration complementary to export promotion to the rest of the world. 
The economic crisis in Central America, which started for most republics at 
the beginning of the 1980s, was sparked off by the decline in the external terms 
of trade and the advent of the debt crisis. The subsequent balance of payments 
problems provoked a shortage of foreign exchange and restrictions on imports 
(including imports from the rest of Central America), thus confirming once 
again that extraregional and intraregional trade are complementary. The 
economic crisis also produced a sharp fall in real consumption per head so that 
demand for imported consumer goods from the rest of Central America 
declined. 
The balance of payments crisis had two further negative effects on CACM 
trade. First, it made it impossible for 'deficit' countries (particularly Nicaragua) 
to service their debts contracted with 'surplus' countries.41 This meant that 
those republics running a trade surplus on bilateral intraregional trade within 
the CACM had no incentive to increase exports and, indeed, had an incentive 
to reduce them. Secondly, any potential expansion of CACM trade was 
weakened by the knowledge that for the region as a whole an increase in trade 
requires an increase in imported inputs for which foreign credits were unlikely 
to be available.42 Thirdly, balance of payments pressures brought an end to the 
exchange rate stability of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s which had effectively 
achieved monetary union in Central America on a dollar standard. In the 1980s, 
exchange rate volatility increased uncertainty and the currency risks associated 
with CACM trade, while countries with overvalued exchange rates were unable 
to provide sufficient incentives for CACM exports. 
During the 1980s, a new economic model for Central America began to be 
promoted. The new model stresses non-traditional exports to the rest of the 
world and it has been pursued most energetically and successfully in Costa 
Rica. The new model leaves little space for CACM for several reasons. First, 
exports are sold outside the region and imported inputs are typically not 
obtained from CACM. Secondly, the model requires a reduction in anti-export 
bias; one of the most important causes of bias is the tariff on imported inputs. 
Any reduction, however, in nominal protection is likely to weaken the 
incentives in favour of CACM trade. 
The new model has been promoted by several international agencies, notably 
the World Bank and USAID. The leverage of these agencies is considerable; 
the World Bank, for example, in its current Structural Adjustment Lending 
(SAL) programme for Costa Rica has insisted on a reduction in nominal tariffs 
and is trying to achieve the same in negotiations with Guatemala. These tariffs, 
however, are part of the Common External Tariff (CET) of the CACM, which 
was revised as recently as 1986. Any unilateral reduction in these tariffs means 
that the CACM ceases to be a Customs Union and becomes, at best, a Free 
Trade Area. This is a momentous step which is being thrust upon Central 
America by the World Bank without sufficient public awareness of what is 
going on.43 
There have also been political factors at work in the decline of the CACM. 
The anti-Marxist forces in Central America together with the Reagan 
administration feared that a recovery of the CACM would indirectly benefit the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. US funds in support of regional institutions, such as 
SIECA, were therefore withdrawn and questions have been raised about the 
competence of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE). 
The advent of the Bush administration and the electoral defeat of the 
Sandinistas has led to a more flexible policy towards Central America. This 
does not mean, however, that US funds are again being used to promote 
regional integration. On the contrary, the dominant line in Washington is that 
regional economic integration is largely irrelevant in Central America's struggle 
for economic reconstruction and recovery.44 
The forces favouring a revival of CACM have been motivated by both 
political and economic considerations. On the economic side, there are still 
many firms (particularly in Guatemala) which depend heavily on exports to 
CACM.45 There is also a feeling among many economists inside and outside 
Central America that a model of industrialisation based only on the national 
market and non-traditional exports to the rest of the world is likely to be very 
fragile and will not offer long-term advantages for the development of new 
industries with good growth prospects. 
On the political side, it has been widely recognised that economic integration 
is needed to underpin the Esquipulas peace process46 - in other words, there 
can be no lasting peace without integration and integration requires some sort 
of economic integration. This line of thinking has influenced the European 
Commission (EC) and is reflected in the Cooperation Agreement signed 
between the EC and Central America; it also influenced the Sanford 
Commission which presented its report in February 1989 and which came out 
strongly in favour of regional economic integration as part of a reconstruction 
package in Central America.47 
Non-traditional exports to the rest of the world are a necessary feature of the 
new model of development for Central America. Their promotion requires a 
revision of many aspects of economic policy in order to remove or eliminate 
anti-export bias; non-traditional exports, however, are not sufficient in 
themselves to rescue Central America from its current economic crisis. The net 
earnings of foreign exchange are much less impressive than the gross earnings, 
the new products are often particularly sensitive to the threat of protection in 
developed country markets, they suffer from weak backward and forward 
linkages and they offer only limited scope for developing technological 
skills.48 
Policies designed to promote non-traditional exports should, however, be 
tailored to avoid undermining regional economic integration. That means 
resisting the World Bank's demands for unilateral reduction in tariffs, although 
a further multilateral reduction in the CET would be acceptable. The 
maintenance of a Customs Union is essential for the viability of regional 
integration in Central America; the creation of a Free Trade Zone through 
unilateral tariff reductions would make it much more difficult to remove the 
non-tariff barriers which currently impede intraregional trade.49 
Merely resisting policies which threaten to undermine CACM is not 
sufficient. Trade within CACM has started to expand again in the last five years 
(see Table 6), as all the republics except Nicaragua return to modest rates of 
GDP growth; the expansion of trade, however, has been far from spectacular 
and many barriers to future growth still remain. The Derecho de Importation 
Centroamerica (DICA) scheme, designed to make it possible to pay for 
intraregional imports in soft currencies, did not function effectively50 and a 
high proportion of CACM trade is believed now to take place with payment in 
kind through barter.51 The intra-CACM debts, built up in particular by 
Honduras and Nicaragua, remain and act as a brake on future CACM 
expansion. There is still very little finance available for imported inputs 
required by the expansion of CACM trade and the new mechanisms to prevent 
the problem of structural deficits arising again in intraregional trade in the 
future have yet to be properly tested. 
Given its commitment in favour of regional integration, expressed through 
the Cooperation Agreement, the European Commission has an important role 
to play. The agreement signed in September 1989 between the EC and the 
Consejo Monetario Centroamericano to reactivate the Camara de Compensation 
is therefore particularly welcome.52 It is still too early to evaluate the success 
of the agreement, but the willingness of the EC to use multilateral funds in 
effect for balance of payments support is an important departure from its 
previous insistence on only project or programme lending.53 
The agreement should lead to a big increase in the proportion of 
intraregional trade passing through the Camara de Compensation. At the same 
time, the greater security of payment for exports should help to produce an 
increase in total intraregional trade. What is not clear is whether the benefits 
of this increase will be equally distributed among the countries of Central 
America. If the benefits are monopolised by the surplus countries (Guatemala 
and Costa Rica), the prospects for an increase in regional integration will again 
be in jeopardy. 
Particular importance therefore attaches to the case of Nicaragua, the 
republic with the greatest problems of structural deficit within CACM trade and 
the largest accumulation of intraregional debts. The new agreement will 
certainly promote Nicaraguan imports from CACM, but without a 
corresponding increase in Nicaraguan exports to CACM the fund created by the 
EC for financing intraregional trade will soon be exhausted and the agreement 
will lapse. 
The defence mechanisms within the agreement are designed to guard against 
such a possibility and an additional fund has been set up to help the weakest 
countries (Nicaragua and Honduras). This is a sensible precaution, but in itself 
it does not guarantee additional exports from Nicaragua. However, the 
draconian stabilisation programme in Nicaragua has so depressed the internal 
market that firms in the private sector are now looking towards exports. With 
many enterprises still unable to compete in the world market, the regional 
market is a realistic alternative now that Nicaragua has a competitive exchange 
rate and the private sector does not have to surrender the proceeds of export 
sales to the Central Bank. Exports to CACM have begun to increase and this 
must improve the prospects for the success of the agreement between the EC 
and the Consejo Monetario. 
Thus, there are prospects for an increase in intraregional trade, but this still 
leaves many problems unresolved. The future success of regional integration 
in Central America depends on the introduction of changes which make 
integration consistent with outward-looking policies and which avoid the errors 
of the past; these included inefficient import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), 
a concentration of income and wealth which limited the effective market for 
many ISI goods to the top three deciles of income earners and an unequal 
distribution of the net gains from integration among the five countries. 
The need to avoid inefficient ISI in the future requires lower tariffs. High 
tariffs imply not only high nominal rates of protection, but also for many 
industries even higher effective rates of protection. There is circumstantial 
evidence that, even after the regional tariff revision adopted at the end of 1985, 
there is 'water' in the tariff on many goods so that a reduction in tariffs is both 
desirable and feasible.54 
However, many of the advantages of RI will be lost if this reduction in 
tariffs is carried out unilaterally (as has been happening). Unilateral tariff 
reductions mean that at a stroke a customs union is turned into a free trade area 
- assuming that intraregional trade is still tariff-free55 - and a free trade area 
is an inferior animal to a customs union. In particular, the ability of one country 
to import goods from outside the region at a lower tariff than applies in other 
countries lowers nominal tariff protection for all countries, but may not lower 
effective protection for the country reducing tariffs unilaterally. Sooner or later, 
such a situation is bound to invite retaliation (probably in the form of non-tariff 
barriers in intraregional trade). 
Thus, the pursuit of tariff reductions within a multilateral regional framework 
is a very high priority. The goal should be a Common External Tariff (CET) 
with lower negotiated tariffs for all counties. The nature of multilateral 
negotiations means that the pace of tariff reductions may be faster than some 
countries would like and slower than others would prefer, but this is a small 
price to pay for maintaining a CET. The CET was the cornerstone of CACM's 
success in the 1960s, distinguishing it from the Latin American Free Trade 
Area (LAFTA),56 and its abandonment in the 1990s would put at risk the 
future of regional integration. 
With a lower CET, Central America should be able to avoid inefficient ISI. 
Not all ISI, however, is inefficient and a lower CET raises the prospect of 
efficient ISI in the region. The difference between inefficient and efficient ISI 
is not a simple matter, but it is determined fundamentally by a downward shift 
in the industry supply curve as a result of learning by doing. Thus, an industry 
where such a shift has not and will not take place is likely to be inefficient 
since it can never compete internationally without heavy tariff protection. An 
industry where such a shift has taken, or will take, place has the chance of 
competing internationally with only modest tariff protection. 
Thus, efficient ISI is more likely where the supply curve is expected to shift 
downwards. However, the downward shift is not independent of tariff changes; 
the prospect of lower nominal tariffs forces firms to change working practices, 
eliminate waste and adopt new technology - all of which are likely to promote 
efficient ISI. These changes cannot be introduced in a vacuum and the 
authorities must be able to guarantee a framework in which firms not only have 
an incentive to modify work practices, but also have the resources do so. 
It follows that tariff reductions, even through a lower CET, cannot be seen 
in isolation from other measures designed to promote industrial efficiency. A 
policy of tariff reduction on its own could eliminate both inefficient and 
efficient ISI since even the potentially efficient firms may not be able to 
compete. It is no accident that trade liberalisation policies work best in 
countries where the policies have been preceded by several years in which 
firms are given incentives to improve their efficiency through recapitalisation 
and labour training. This is an additional reason why trade liberalisation in 
Central America, as argued in the previous section, should be gradual in order 
to increase the chances of efficient ISI. 
It was argued in the previous section that the best prospect for non-
traditional exports to ROW lies with agroindustries. The latter require raw 
materials, which must be processed and in some cases reprocessed. The natural 
resource base is relatively limited for each Central American country, but is 
still substantial for the region as a whole. There are countries with a shortage 
of forests (e.g. Costa Rica) and others with a surplus (e.g. Honduras); there are 
republics with very high man/land ratios (e.g. El Salvador) and others with low 
ratios (e.g. Nicaragua). When decisions on agroindustries are taken at a national 
level, taking into account only raw materials available at the national level, the 
results are likely to be disappointing. Decisions need to be taken at the regional 
level, where the resource base is so much richer; intraregional trade in raw 
materials, relatively unimportant so far, could and should become a major 
component of commerce within Central America. 
The existence of a marketed surplus of a given raw material is an obvious 
incentive for setting up an agroindustry to process it; indeed, it is a classic 
example of forward linkages. Similarly, the existence of a given agroindustry 
is an incentive to produce more raw materials through backward linkages. 
Clearly, the two processes are interdependent, but they are not automatic. In 
particular, if the agroindustries do not come into existence, then there is little 
chance of increased intraregional trade in raw materials and any marketed 
surplus will have to be sold abroad. 
Certainly, there are now additional incentives to set up agroindustries using 
regional raw materials. The strategy of non-traditional exports pursued by Costa 
Rica, for example, has created a richer natural resource base which could be 
exploited by firms throughout the region to capture value added through 
processing and export to ROW. However, there is now a case for reviving the 
old Integration Industries Scheme (IIS) which operated at the beginning of the 
1960s.57 The IIS, which was designed to distribute new strategic industries 
equally among the five countries, suffered from the disadvantage that it created 
a regional monopoly. However, agroindustries exporting outside the region 
would not be subject to the same charge. 
Under this new IIS scheme, certain agroindustries (perhaps those requiring 
particularly heavy capital investments) would be designated as integration 
industries and would be allocated among the member countries of CACM. A 
beneficiary of the scheme would be protected from competition within the 
region, but would have to sell most of its output to ROW. The absence of 
regional competition would provide a greater guarantee of access to raw 
materials in sufficient quantity needed to mount the kind of large-scale 
investments required to capture economies of scale in agroindustries. 
Clearly, the IIS scheme should not be used for all agroindustries. Although 
the problem of regional monopoly disappears if the output is sold abroad, there 
is still the problem of a regional monopsony as the industry would be the major 
buyer of certain raw materials. However, the IIS remains a very effective way 
of making sure that all members of CACM enjoy at least some of the net gains 
from regional integration. After its de facto collapse in the mid-1960s, CACM 
never found an alternative instrument that could be so effective in distributing 
regional benefits. 
Intraregional trade in agricultural products need not be confined to raw 
materials. There is also a strong case for increased intraregional trade in basic 
grains so that deficits and surpluses at the national level can be matched at the 
regional level. This has long been a goal in Central America,58 but it was 
never realised because cheap food policies led in the past to duty-free imports 
or food aid under PL480 and other measures. The balance of payments crisis 
in the 1980s, however, reached such intensity that even food imports have been 
affected. The result has been a number of import restrictions which have 
promoted import substitution in agriculture (ISA). 
It is generally accepted that much of this ISA, including in basic grains, 
leads to production at unit costs higher than those prevailing in international 
markets. It may be possible to justify this in terms of the low opportunity costs 
of the factors of production used in ISA and the high opportunity cost of the 
foreign exchange saved. However, just as with efficient ISI, it is preferable to 
promote efficient ISA. This could be more easily achieved through increased 
trade in basic grains at the regional level. In turn, regional trade in basic grains 
requires the elimination of various non-tariff barriers within CACM.59 
Regional cooperation is also possible in a whole host of areas including 
energy supply, road systems and telecommunications. These areas have in the 
past attracted cooperation through CACM. New areas for cooperation outside 
the framework of CACM include international shipping, air cargo transport, 
marketing in third countries and a common negotiating position in international 
fora (e.g. International Coffee Agreement, GATT, European Community). 
Cooperation in these areas has hardly begun and it is still not uncommon to 
find the five republics adopting very different positions (as happened at the 
October 1989 meeting of the International Coffee Organisation), but the 
potential benefits from cooperation are enormous. 
The Internal Market 
The national market of each Central American republic, still very limited at the 
end of the 1970s, narrowed even further in the 1980s as a result of the fall in 
real GDP per head and the increased concentration of income and wealth. Many 
studies now suggest that a majority of the population in some countries is living 
in poverty. 
Poverty on this scale leads to immense social and political problems. 
However, it is also an economic problem since it narrows the effective market 
in Central America from 25 million to, say, 10 million. This is not much more 
than the population of Guatemala on its own and reduces the chances that firms 
will be able to exploit economies of scale. 
The traditional method of tackling poverty in Central America has been 
indirect, through the fiscal system and other redistributive mechanisms. It has 
manifestly failed to work, given the extent of poverty in the region, and the 
reasons are not hard to find. Even in rich countries, indirect methods of poverty 
alleviation through redistributive taxes have not in general been very effective 
and this is likely to be even more true of a region, such as Central America, 
where only a tiny proportion of the population pays direct (income) taxes. 
In the context of the 1990s there are other reasons for pessimism regarding 
an indirect assault on poverty via the tax system. The lack of confidence in the 
public sector and public sector institutions in many parts of the region does not 
give one confidence in the administrative capability of the state to carry out the 
necessary measures. 
It follows that the assault on poverty, the improvement in income distribution 
and the widening of the effective market is more likely to succeed if carried out 
directly rather than indirectly. In other words, the allocation of resources at the 
point of production needs to favour these goals. 
The proposals made in the previous two sections for promoting international 
and regional trade were designed to be consistent with poverty reduction. 
Agroindustrial exports to ROW, for example, using raw materials produced in 
the region, are likely to be labour-intensive if the indirect as well as direct 
employment effects are included in the calculations; gradual and selective trade 
liberalisation policies are consistent with the promotion of industries which give 
priority to higher labour productivity through training programmes. 
However, these measures in themselves are probably not sufficient. Although 
the private sector almost certainly does provide the key to poverty reduction in 
the 1990s (the main task facing the public sector is to increase its efficiency), 
it is essential to remember that there are two private sectors; the first (PI) is 
essentially the formal sector, while the second (P2) consists of microempresas, 
artesania, cooperatives, minifundias etc. Unless the existence of P2 is explicitly 
recognised, the benefits of renewed growth may be disproportionately captured 
by PI without any significant reduction in poverty. 
There are some parts of P2 which can be incorporated into the proposed 
long-run model of development quite easily. There is no reason, for example, 
why artesania should not benefit from the promotion of non-traditional exports; 
similarly, minifundias should be able to participate in increased regional trade 
in basic grains, while producer cooperatives are not intrinsically at any 
disadvantage in the supply of raw materials for agroindustry. 
The potential benefits of the model, however, will be foregone if P2 is 
prevented from taking part in economic expansion as a result of various supply-
side bottlenecks. These include the absence of credit for working capital, lack 
of knowledge about foreign markets and the shortage of training programmes 
for the necessary new skills. 
The traditional proposal for solving these problems and eliminating the 
bottlenecks usually involves an increased role for the state. There is no doubt 
that state participation is important in eliminating bottlenecks faced by P2, but 
in the context of the reduced administrative capacity of the public sector it is 
probably not sufficient. It is therefore important to try and channel the 
combined resources of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating 
in the region towards this problem. The aggregate presence of the NGOs in 
Central America is considerable; they do not have the financial resources of the 
multilateral agencies, but they do have enormous flexibility and enjoy 
considerable support among the population at large. They are therefore ideally 
suited to channelling resources and implementing programmes among the 
thousands of tiny establishments that make up P2. 
There are still many individuals and families, currently living in poverty, 
who may not be touched by any of these proposals. They may be un- or under-
employed, virtually outside the market economy and dependent on transfers 
from relatives or on begging. Economic growth in general cannot be relied on 
to eliminate this problem, since 'trickle-down' (derrame) has not proved 
efficacious in Central America. 
The main source of transfers to such groups since the mid-1980s has almost 
certainly been remittances from relatives living outside the country (usually in 
the United States). Estimates differ, but the value of remittances for the region 
as a whole is probably around $1,000 million annually compared with 
commodity exports of $4,500 million. Thus, these remittances are already a 
major source of foreign exchange (the major source in El Salvador); 
furthermore, they can be expected to grow in the 1990s since the numbers of 
Central Americans living abroad is not likely to diminish significantly and their 
average earnings can be expected to rise. 
The remittances have undoubtedly alleviated poverty in Central America. 
However, they have not done much to eliminate poverty because they have not 
been used efficiently. The bulk of the remittances (over 80 per cent) is spent 
on non-durable consumption and the remainder is often spent on paying off 
debts. Of course, some increase in non-durable consumption from remittances 
is both inevitable and desirable, but what is not acceptable is that a major 
source of foreign exchange earnings should have virtually no impact on capital 
accumulation. Thus, virtually nothing is available for increasing the capital 
stock per worker which in the long-run is the most effective way of reducing 
poverty. Furthermore, the dollars are sold on the black market and provide a 
vehicle for capital flight. 
It is therefore essential that these remittances are captured through the 
financial system in such a way that they prevent capital flight and promote 
investment (in fixed, working and human capital) by the recipients. Again, it 
is possible that the NGOs, together with the Churches, could play a role. 
Furthermore, the details of such schemes must clearly be worked out at the 
local level, where NGOs and Churches are often the only institutions with the 
necessary detailed knowledge. This is not to deny that both the state and PI 
have a role to play in formulating a financial system which can help to capture 
the remittances in an efficient way, but simply to recognise that the problem 
will require an unconventional approach if recipients of remittances are to be 
persuaded to use a proportion of the receipts for the purpose of financial or real 
investment.60 
Conclusions 
This paper began with the statement of a number of goals which any long-run 
model of development for Central America must set itself. It is worth stressing, 
therefore, how and why the model outlined here can contribute towards the 
fulfilment of those goals. 
The target of rapid recovery of real GDP per head is met by a model which 
emphasises the complementarity between the national, regional and 
international markets. In the model, the expansion of one source of demand 
does not imply a reduction in other sources of demand. The preferred policies 
are consistent with the simultaneous expansion of the three markets. 
The target of income redistribution coupled with poverty reduction is to be 
achieved through a new allocation of resources across sectors and industries 
favouring those where the direct and indirect employment multiplier is high. At 
the same time, special measures need to be adopted towards the non-formal 
sector (P2) to ensure that it shares in the benefits of economic expansion. 
The industrialisation project is promoted in a variety of ways. First, the 
spread of agroindustries contributes to the creation of new industries able to 
capture additional value added from the exploitation of regional raw materials. 
Secondly, efficient ISI within the CACM leads to the introduction of new 
industries which initially sell their output under the protection of the new CET. 
Thirdly, the strategy of gradual and selective trade liberalisation leads to the 
promotion of manufactured exports where comparative advantage is derived 
from wage costs (including skilled labour). 
The goal of introducing a certain autonomous technological capability is 
achieved through the need to find new ways to exploit the processing of raw 
materials to satisfy the changing tastes of consumers in developed countries, 
through the need to compete in the markets for international services and 
through the opportunities for basing comparative advantage on skilled labour. 
The target for food self-sufficiency at the regional level is achieved through 
import substitution in agriculture in general and intraregional trade in basic 
grains in particular. In addition, the promotion of non-traditional exports will 
create an increased variety of foodstuffs (including fruits and vegetables) which 
can satisfy changes in regional demand. 
The main constraint on the model identified ex ante was the balance of 
payments. This constraint is tackled in the model through both import 
substitution and export promotion; import substitution takes place at the 
regional level in both agriculture and industry, while export promotion takes 
place at the national level in non-traditional goods and services. 
No effort has been made to incorporate the environmental constraint into the 
model formally. Instead, it has been stressed that development in the 1990s 
must be 'sustainable', i.e. the model must be consistent with the maintenance, 
if not improvement, of the environment. 
In view of the damage to the environment in the last 40 years in Central 
America and the continuing pressures tending towards environmental 
destruction, it may be necessary to adopt an accounting framework which 
explicitly acknowledges the environment as a factor of production and calls for 
expenditure on repair and maintenance to preserve the value of environmental 
capital. There are several such schemes currently under discussion.61 
The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) does not yet allow 
for the impact of development on the environment. It is also difficult to use the 
SNA for a direct attack on poverty since the target groups are not adequately 
represented. It is, therefore, appropriate to use a Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) approach, which can be used not only to monitor environmental 
problems but also to target rural and urban groups at risk from poverty. This 
also makes possible the construction of computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models for the region, which experiment with changes in instruments such as 
tariffs to assess their impact on targets such as poverty reduction. 
Energy supply was mentioned as a constraint on the model. It is easier to 
match supply and demand at the regional rather than national level and the 
model calls for cooperation within the framework of CACM to reduce national 
imbalances. Some projections, however, suggest that all five countries may face 
national deficits by the year 2000 so that even regional cooperation will not be 
sufficient. Faced with this problem, the need for an autonomous technological 
capability becomes even more pressing than ever since energy demand can 
always be modified through appropriate technological changes at the 
establishment level. 
Although most of the analysis in this paper has been conducted at the 
regional level, it would be inappropriate to conclude without a number of 
observations at the national level. The five republics are not the same and the 
differences do affect the conclusions. 
Two republics (Nicaragua and El Salvador) will have to concentrate for the 
first half of the 1990s on economic reconstruction, i.e. rebuilding that part of 
their economy which has been wiped out in the 1980s. Thus, in the case of 
these two republics a concentration on traditional exports is legitimate since in 
both cases output is far below the previous peaks. 
Trade liberalisation policies will not lead to the same pattern of new export 
activities in each country. While Costa Rica will find itself at a comparative 
disadvantage in maquila industries as a result of its relatively high labour costs 
and unfavourable geographical location (furthest from the USA), the opposite 
is likely to be true of Guatemala and El Salvador where the net foreign 
exchange receipts from maquiladoras could be significant. Guatemala is also 
the country likely to gain most from handicraft exports, although El Salvador 
also has reasonable prospects in this area. 
Costa Rica is likely to have the best future in exports of services (other than 
tourism) in the 1990s. The reason is the intimate connection between success 
in this area and labour force skills; tourism, however, remains a major 
possibility in Guatemala, if the problem of political instability is resolved, and 
in Honduras, particularly now that the problem of an uncompetitive exchange 
rate seems to have been overcome. 
Under a revived IIS, all five countries would benefit from the growth of 
agroindustries exporting to ROW. Without the IIS, the major beneficiaries 
would be those countries capable of raising the finance for the necessary 
investments; the most likely countries to benefit would be Costa Rica and 
Guatemala. Since these two countries are already the ones most likely to benefit 
from a revival in CACM, this emphasises the need for mechanisms such as the 
IIS for ensuring that all countries share in the net gains. 
Intraregional trade in basic grains and raw materials creates special 
opportunities for Honduras and Nicaragua in view of their relative advantages 
in terms of access to fertile land, abundant supplies of cheap labour (at least 
after demobilisation in Nicaragua) and a small farm sector with title to land. 
Guatemala could also benefit from this aspect of intraregional trade. 
All five countries can expect to gain from efficient ISI within the CACM 
following tariff reductions. While some high cost inefficient ISI will be put at 
risk, particularly in Honduras, the reduction of external tariffs on imported 
inputs will allow firms to consider production of goods previously considered 
uneconomic, while those existing firms that do survive trade liberalisation will 
be well placed to increase production within an expanding regional market. 
The greatest problem could be faced by El Salvador, which has no surplus 
land, a desperate shortage of finance for investment and a poorly trained labour 
force. This emphasises yet again the special role played by remittances in El 
Salvador, since the scale of remittances in El Salvador makes them 
quantitatively and qualitatively different from elsewhere in the region. Indeed, 
one is forced to conclude that the more efficient use of remittances is an 
essential condition for ensuring that El Salvador has a realistic chance of 
meeting the model's targets in the next decade. 
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3. Numerous studies by the United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), have drawn attention to the extent of 
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(Washington DC, January 1991). 
9. Known as the Oliveira-Tanzi effect, the impact of accelerating inflation on 
real tax receipts was also responsible for the collapse of the ratio of government 
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11. The phrase 'Washington consensus' has become famous following the 
publication of an influential book on policy reform in Latin America by John 
Williamson. See Williamson, J. (ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much 
has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). 
12. The strength of the Salvadoran currency has even led to suggestions that the 
country is suffering from 'Dutch disease' - a phenomenon more commonly 
associated with energy exporters. 
13. The Cooperation Agreement, signed between the European Community 
(EC) and the Central American republics (with the addition of Panama) in 1985, 
has provided for an increase in mulitilateral aid to the region in every year. 
Although less than the cumulative total of bilateral aid from the 12 EC 
members, multilateral aid is more important than bilateral aid from any single 
country and reached approximately $150 million in 1990. 
14. In May 1991, the Nicaraguan government reached agreement with members 
of the Paris Club on repaying arrears to multilateral agencies which rendered the 
country eligible again for loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (no arrears were accumulated with the IMF by the 
Sandinistas). 
15. For Latin America as a whole capital flight was reversed in 1989 and 1990 
with a positive net inflow. However, almost all the increase was explained by 
capital repatriation in Chile and Mexico - the two countries which had adjusted 
most successfully in the 1980s. See Latin Finance, May 1991, p. 7. 
16. The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) collapsed at the end of 1988. 
Prices fell sharply as supply was no longer constrained by export quotas. 
Producers of high quality coffee, however, experienced a relatively modest drop 
in price. Guatemalan and Salvadoran exporters in particular were able to 
compensate for the fall in price by expanding the volume sold and even 
increased the total value of coffee exports. 
17. At present the tariff on bananas applied by the twelve members of the 
European Community varies from 20 per cent to zero. The formation of a 
single market requires harmonisation of all tariffs. In theory, this could mean 
a tariff for the whole EC of anything between 0 and 20 per cent. However, the 
EC members are obliged under GATT rules not to increase any existing tariffs; 
furthermore, under the Uruguay round negotiations the EC has already 
committed itself to eliminating tariffs on tropical agricultural products. It seems 
more likely, therefore, that tariffs will be harmonised downwards rather than 
upwards. 
18. See the Report of the International Commission for Central American 
Recovery and Development, Poverty, Conflict and Hope - A Turning Point in 
Central America (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 113, table 1. 
19. A countervailing duty was applied against US imports of Costa Rican cut 
flowers in the mid-1980s despite the fact that the "subsidies" which had 
provoked the retaliatory action had been awarded to exporters with the approval 
of US AID and other international agencies. 
20. Lome IV has now been signed and will last for ten years so that the Lome 
agreement is now assured of an existence until the end of the century. Lome 
IV does not differ substantially from Lome III, although total transfers from the 
EC are set to rise by nearly 50 per cent. 
21. The Bush Initiative, launched soon after President Bush came to power, 
proposed a series of reforms in US-Latin American relations. However, the one 
which caught the Latin American imagination was the offer of a free trade 
agreement (FTA) stretching form one end of the Americas to the other. With 
the FTA between Mexico and the USA expected to be in place by 1993, Central 
American countries were anxious not to be excluded from an integration scheme 
which raised the prospect of trade diversion (e.g. US duty-free imports from 
Mexico of goods previously purchased from Central America). At a meeting in 
Tuxtla Gutierrez in January 1991, President Salinas de Gortari of Mexico 
responded positively to Central American concerns and offered to work towards 
the eventual inclusion of Central America in a broader FTA. 
22. There is some uncertainty regarding income distribution and poverty in 
Costa Rica in the 1980s. Nevertheless, even in Costa Rica real wages at the end 
of the 1980s (based on average remunerations declared by persons covered by 
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